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This Article examines the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) with a focus on the intellectual
property norms that it seeks to develop. The first half of the Article
focuses on the RCEP Agreement as a mega-regional agreement. It
begins by briefly discussing the historical origins of the RCEP. It
then explores three possible scenarios in which the RCEP
Agreement will help shape trade and intellectual property norms
in the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, the Article evaluates the
scenarios in which the agreement will function as a rival pact, a
building block, and an alternative path. The second half of this
Article turns to a more specific focus on intellectual property
norms that are being established through the RCEP negotiations.
It not only discusses the latest leaked draft of the RCEP
intellectual property chapter, but it also closely analyzes this
chapter in five distinct areas: copyright, trademark, patent, trade
secret, and intellectual property enforcement. This Article then
tackles the question concerning whether the RCEP Agreement
will contain an intellectual property chapter-and, if so, whether
such a chapter will look like the intellectual property chapter in
the Trans-Pacific. Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The Article
concludes by exploring whether the RCEP intellectual property
chapter will, and should, contain high or low protection and
enforcement standards.
Copyright C 2017 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law and
Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University School of Law. Earlier versions of this
Article were delivered as a keynote speech at the 2016 Meeting of the Asian Pacific
Copyright Association at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law and as the 20th
ACIP Intellectual Property Forum Lecture at the Intellectual Property School of South
China University of Technology. They were also presented at the Second Annual
Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable at Texas A&M University School of Law and
as a public lecture at Peking University-School of Transnational Law. The Author is
grateful to the participants of these events for valuable comments and suggestions. This
Article draws on the Author's earlier research on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, and China's free trade agreements in the
Fordham International Law Journal, the SMU Law Review, and the U.C. Davis Law
Review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, the Trans-Pacific Partnership' (TPP) has
garnered considerable media, policy, and scholarly attention. 2
Although the TPP Agreement was signed in Auckland, New Zealand
on February 4, 2016, and has been described as the Obama
administration's "cardinal priority and a cornerstone of [its] Pivot to
1. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [h tps://perma.
cc/YW8Y-Z9LQ] (archived Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter TPP Agreement].
2. For the Author's discussions of the TPP, see Peter K. Yu, The Investment-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829 (2017) [hereinafter
Yu, Investment-Related Aspects]; Peter K. Yu, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY (Christophe
Geiger ed., forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Yu, Investor-State Dispute Settlement]; Peter
K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property Enforcement, 60 DRAKE
L. REV. DISCOURSE 16,24-28 (2012); Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1129 (2014) [hereinafter Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities].
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Asia,"3 the agreement received very limited support, if any, from the
presidential candidates representing both the Democratic and
Republican Parties.
On the campaign trail, Donald Trump made his opposition loud
and clear by lambasting the TPP as "another disaster, done and pushed
by special interests who want to rape [the] country."4 After he entered
office, he followed through by signing a memorandum directing the
United States Trade Representative to "withdraw[] [the United States]
as a signatory of the TPP and ... from the TPP negotiating process."5
Released on the first day of his first full week in office, the document
stated, "it is the intention of [his new] Administration to deal directly
with individual countries on a one-on-one (or bilateral) basis in
negotiating future trade deals." 6 Not only did the Trump
administration abandon the TPP Agreement after six years of
exhaustive negotiations, but it also shifted policy emphasis away from
regional and plurilateral trade agreements.7
While the TPP was catching public attention, another equally
important regional pact, the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), has slowly emerged in the Asia-Pacific region.
This agreement is currently being negotiated between Australia,
China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the ten members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 8 Launched in
November 2012 under the ASEAN+6 framework, the RCEP
3. KURT M. CAMPBELL, THE PIVOT: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN STATECRAFT IN
ASIA 268 (2016).
4. Jessica Hopper & Ines de la Cuetara, Donald Trump Slams Trans-Pacific
Partnership as "a Continuing Rape of Our Country," ABC NEWS (Jun 29, 2016),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-slams-trans-pacific-partnership-continuing-
rape/story?id=40213090 [https://perma.cc/25DV-RQM7] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
5. White House, Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the





7. See Peter K. Yu, Trump's Trade Policy Is More Predictable and Less
Isolationist Than Critics Think, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 3, 2017),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/trumps-trade-policy-is-more-predictable-and-less-
isolationist-than-critics-think-2017-02-02 (discussing the shift from multilateralism to
bilateralism).
8. ASEAN is negotiating the RCEP as a bloc. Its ten current members are
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN Member Countries, AsS'N SOUTHEAST ASIAN
NATIONS, http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/RN2Q-CNKJ] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
negotiations built on past trade and non-trade discussions between
ASEAN and its six major Asia-Pacific neighbors.9
Although the RCEP is rarely analyzed and only occasionally
mentioned, its negotiations deserve greater media, policy, and
scholarly attention for at least three reasons. First, this partnership is
important globally. The sixteen RCEP negotiating parties "account for
almost half of the world's population, almost 30 per cent of global GDP
[gross domestic product] and over a quarter of world exports."1 0 These
figures compare favorably with those relating to the TPP, which covers
"40% of global GDP and some 30% of worldwide trade in both goods
and services."1
Second, the RCEP is highly important within the Asia-Pacific
region. Once established, this partnership will cover not only China
and India, two of the most economically powerful BRICS countries
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 1 2 but it will also
include two high-income Asian economies (Japan and South Korea)
and six other TPP partners (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam).
Third, the RCEP could serve as a viable alternative to the TPP13
and has become quite important following the United States'
withdrawal. Given the Trump administration's position and the other
TPP partners' inability to resuscitate the agreement,'4 the TPP has
9. See Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Nov. 20, 2012), http://dfat.gov.aultrade/agreements/
rcep/news/Documents/joint-declaration-on-the-launch-of-negotiations-for-the-regional-
comprehensive-economic-partnership.pdf [https://perma.cc/N35W-XVHS] (archived Feb. 6,
2017) [hereinafter Joint Declaration] (launching the RCEP negotiations).
10. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, DEP'T FOREIGN AFF. &
TRADE (Austl.), http://dfat.gov.aultrade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-
economic-partnership.aspx (last visited July 6, 2016) [https://perma.cclXT7B-NUGT]
(archived Feb. 7, 2017).
11. David A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega-Trade Agreements for the Pacific
Rim, 33 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 57, 59 (2016).
12. For discussions of the BRICS countries, see generally ANDREW F. COOPER,
THE BRICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2016); JIM O'NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP:
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND (2011); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property Negotiations, the BRICS Factor and the Changing North-South Debate, in A
BRICS-LAWYERS' GUIDE TO GLOBAL COOPERATION (Rostam Neuwirth et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2017); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective
Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines].
13. See infra Part III (discussing the potential for the RCEP to serve as a rival
pact, a building block, and an alternative path).
14. Shortly after the United States' withdrawal, Australia, Japan, Singapore,
and New Zealand explored ways to resuscitate the agreement. See Bhavan Jaipragas,
Can the Trans-Pacific Partnership Be Salvaged? Forget Trump-Malaysia, Australia,
New Zealand Think So, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/
week-asialgeopolitics/article/2065021/trans-pacific-partnership-salvageable-forget-trump-
malaysia ("Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said he had held ... talks with
his Japanese, New Zealand and Singaporean counterparts [in regard to options following
676 [VOL. 50:.673
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now been put on life support.15 It will likely meet the same fate as the
widely-criticized Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 16 (ACTA).
Despite its adoption in April 2011, ACTA has thus far been ratified by
only one country-Japan, the country of depository.'7
This Article examines the RCEP with a focus on the intellectual
property norms that it seeks to develop. Part II briefly discusses the
partnership's historical origins. Part III explores three possible
scenarios in which the RCEP Agreement will help shape trade and
intellectual property norms in the Asia-Pacific region. This Part
evaluates the scenarios in which the agreement will function as a rival
pact, a building block, and an alternative path. Part IV focuses
specifically on the latest leaked draft of the RCEP intellectual property
chapter. 18 It closely analyzes this chapter in five distinct areas:
copyright, trademark, patent, trade secret, and intellectual property
enforcement.
Part V tackles the question concerning whether the RCEP
Agreement will contain an intellectual property chapter-and, if so,
whether such a chapter will look like the intellectual property chapter
in the TPP Agreement. Part VI turns to a much harder question
concerning whether the RCEP intellectual property chapter will, and
should, contain high or low protection and enforcement standards. This
Part explores the pros and cons of high intellectual property standards
in the Asia-Pacific region. Taken together, these two Parts seek to
highlight the complexities of intellectual property norm setting in the
region and the challenging policy dilemmas confronting the RCEP
negotiating parties.
the United States' withdrawal]."); see also id. ("Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia
were among the nations that signalled enthusiasm to continue with an 11-member
partnership in the absence of the United States."). These efforts, however, did not bear
fruit. At the time of writing, no country is actively pursuing any effort to ratify the
agreement.
15. See Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-
regional Agreement on Life Support), 21 SMU Scl. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(discussing the United States' withdrawal from the TPP and its significance).
16. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50
I.L.M. 243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA].
17. See id. art. 45 ("The Government of Japan shall be the Depositary of this
Agreement."); see also Maira Sutton, Japan Was the First to Ratify ACTA. Will They Join
TPP Next?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/japan-ratify-acta-will-they-join-tpp-next [https:I/
perma.cc/X7HF-GAZL] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) (reporting Japan's ratification).
18. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Intellectual Property
Chapter (Oct. 15 draft), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RCEP-IP-Chapter-
150ctober2015.docx [https://perma.cc/D3RK-BDBE] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter
October 15 Draft].
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II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS
Although the RCEP negotiations were launched in November
2012 19 -more than two years after the beginning of the TPP
negotiations-they were not established solely as a reactive response
to the latter. Instead, the RCEP negotiations built on prior
negotiations at various fora in the Asia-Pacific region: ASEAN+3
(ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea), ASEAN+6, and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum.20
Within ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, countries in the Asia-Pacific
region have actively explored ways to facilitate greater regional
economic integration and cooperation. In October 2001, in a report to
ASEAN+3 leaders, the East Asian Vision Group, which was charged
with "develop [ing] a road map to guide future regional cooperation,"21
recommended the establishment of the East Asia Free Trade Area.22
Although China strongly supported this proposal, Japan and other
Asian countries had serious reservations about China's potential
dominance in this pact.23
19. Joint Declaration, supra note 9.
20. See generally MARK BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE AsIA-PACIFIC: ASEAN,
APEC AND BEYOND 17-55, 74-101 (2009) [hereinafter BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE
AsIA-PACIFIC] (discussing ASEAN, APEC, and ASEAN+3); MARK BEESON, REGIONALISM
AND GLOBALIZATION IN EAST ASIA: POLITICS, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
216-37 (2007) [hereinafter BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION] (discussing
APEC and ASEAN+3).
21. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 20, at 78; see also
BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 20, at 233 ("Following an APEC
precedent, at the instigation of South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, an East Asian
Vision Group . . . was established in 1998 to develop a blueprint for further cooperation
under ASEAN+3 auspices.").
22. See Shujiro Urata, Japan's FTA Strategy and a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific [hereinafter Urata, Japan's FTA Strategy], in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA? THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 99, 106 (Charles E.
Morrison & Eduardo Pedrosa eds., 2007) [hereinafter AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?] ("At
the Leaders' summit meeting of ASEAN+3 in 1998 it was decided that an East Asia
Vision Group be set up to study the long-term vision for economic cooperation. The group
has presented the leaders with its recommendations, which include the establishment of
an East Asia FTA.").
23. As Mark Beeson recounted:
[O]ther East Asian nations thought India's inclusion [in ASEAN+6] would
actually be desirable, precisely because it might provide a "hedge" against
Chinese dominance. Japan, predictably enough, was not keen to see its principal
rival for regional leadership honors gaining a dominant position in the
[ASEAN+3] grouping and was thus keen to dissipate Chinese influence.
Likewise, some of the smaller Southeast Asian countries[,] like Singapore, were
also keen to balance Chinese influence by bringing in new members like
Australia.
BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 20, at 88 (footnotes omitted);
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Achieving a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific: Does the TPP
678 [VOL. 50:673
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In August 2006, Japan advanced an alternative proposal
concerning the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia.24
Covering not only ASEAN+3 members but also the three remaining
ASEAN+6 members (Australia, India, and New Zealand), this
partnership would dilute China's influence in the regional pact while
adding to the mix a major source of natural resources-namely,
Australia.25
Around that time, APEC members also actively explored regional
integration and cooperation efforts. In November 2006, APEC began
studying the concept of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
(FTAAP). 26 Three years later, APEC leaders pledged to create an
agreement o realize this conceptual vision. As Fred Bergsten observed
at that time, the proposed pact could
* catalyse a substantively successful Doha Round [Doha Development Round
of Trade Negotiations];
* offer an alternative "Plan B" to restore the momentum of liberalization if
Doha does falter badly;
* prevent a further, possibly explosive, proliferation of bilateral and sub-
regional [preferential trade agreements] that create substantial new
discrimination and discord within the Asia-Pacific region;
* avoid renewed risk of "drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific" as East
Asian, and perhaps Western Hemisphere, regional initiatives produce
disintegration of the Asia-Pacific rather than the integration that APEC was
created to foster;
Present the Most Attractive Path? [hereinafter Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP], in THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE
AGREEMENT 223, 227 (C.L. Lim et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP] ("The [East Asian FTA] model has been viewed with some caution by
Japan, which is concerned that such an agreement would be imbalanced, with China
being by far the largest economy."); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
27, 50-51 (2011) ("Japan prefers ASEAN+6 because it would include more economies to
counterbalance China, and would still exclude the United States."); Shintaro Hamanaka,
Trans-Pacific Partnership Versus Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership:
Control of Membership and Agenda Setting 10 (Asian Development Bank, Working
Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146, 2014),
https://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP146_Hamanaka Trans-PacificPartnership.
pdf [https://perma.ce/84CD-CDJL] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) ("Japan considered adding
Australia and India as being necessary to dilute the PRC's influence, which is a
necessary condition for its leadership of the group.").
24. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 23, at 228 (discussing the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership proposed by Japan); Urata, Japan's FTA
Strategy, supra note 22, at 106-07 (discussing Japan's efforts to formulate and
implement an economic partnership agreement under the ASEAN+6 framework).
25. See BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 20, at 224
(noting "Australia's rapidly expanding resource exports to industrializing Asia"); Urata,
Japan's FTA Strategy, supra note 22, at 111 C'[O]ne of the motivations for a possible
Japan-Australia FTA is to secure food and mineral supplies. Securing natural resources
is of critical importance for Japan because it is poorly endowed with natural resources.").
26. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 23, at 223.
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* channel the China-U.S. economic conflict into a more constructive and less
confrontational context that could defuse at least some of its attendant
tension and risk; and
* revitalize APEC itself, which is now of enhanced importance because of the
risks of Asia-Pacific and especially China-U.S. fEssures.27
Since then, APEC leaders have endorsed various declarations laying
down the incremental steps needed to realize the FTAAP. These
documents include the Pathways to FTAAP,2 8 which was adopted in
November 2010, and the Beijing Roadmap for APEC's Contribution to
the Realization of the FTAAP2 9 (Beijing Roadmap), which was released
four years later.
In November 2011, ASEAN, with the support of both China and
Japan, proposed to merge the initiatives concerning the East Asia Free
Trade Area and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia
to form the RCEP. 30 At the Nineteenth ASEAN Summit in Bali,
Indonesia, ASEAN leaders adopted the Framework for Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 31 (RCEP Framework). The
negotiations were finally launched in November 2012 at the Twenty-
first ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. As ASEAN+6 leaders
declared at that time, the RCEP negotiations were established to
27. C. Fred Bergsten, A Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific in the Wake of the
Faltering Doha Round: Trade Policy Alternatives for APEC, in AN APEC TRADE
AGENDA?, supra note 22, at 15, 32-33.
28. Pathways to FTAAP, AsIA-PAC. ECoN. COOPERATION (Nov. 13, 2010),
http://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/leaders-declarations/2010/2010_aelm/pathways-to-
ftaap.aspx [https://perma.cc/A3G5-NBKV] (archived Feb. 7, 2017).
29. The Beijing Roadmap for APEC's Contribution to the Realization of the
FTAAP, ASIA-PAC. EcoN. COOPERATION (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.apec.org/Meeting-
Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2014/2014_aelm/2014_aelmannexa.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9BUA-AVWY] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Beijing Roadmap].
30. See Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 11 (discussing the joint proposal from
China and Japan to facilitate East Asian economic cooperation); Ganeshan Wignaraja,
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Initial Assessment, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 93, 94 (Tang Guoqiang & Peter A.
Petri eds., 2014) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION]
("The RCEP neatly bridges the two proposals [of the East Asian Free Trade Agreement
and the Comprehensive Economic Agreement] by adopting an open accession scheme so
that any party that meets the template can join. Furthermore, ASEAN is accorded the
coordinating role for the RCEP process, which means better inclusion of the interests of
smaller ASEAN economies.").
31. ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,
AsS'N SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (June 12, 2012), http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-
framework-for-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership [https://perma.cc/H83J-
C2PT] (archived Feb. 7 2017); see also "ASEAN Community in a Global Community of
Nations" Chair's Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit, Bali, ASS'N SOUTHEAST ASIAN
NATIONS ¶¶ 45-46 (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/
documents/19th%20summit/CS.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQT3-JZTP] (archived Feb. 7,
2017) (welcoming the ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership).
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* [alchieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial
economic partnership agreement establishing an open trade and investment
environment in the region to facilitate the expansion of regional trade and
investment and contribute to global economic growth and development; [and]
* [bloost economic growth and equitable economic development, advance
economic cooperation and broaden and deepen integration in the region
through the RCEP, which will build upon our existing economic linkages.32
Although the ASEAN+6 leaders' joint declaration did not
specifically mention the TPP, there is no denying that the development
of this United States-led partnership has greatly accelerated the
RCEP negotiations.33 The latter negotiations were particularly urgent
when two major ASEAN+6 economies, China and India, were
intentionally excluded from the TPP.34 Also excluded were other key
ASEAN+6 members, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea,
and Thailand. While some of these countries had been invited to the
TPP negotiations but declined to participate,35 others were simply
ignored or left out.
32. Joint Declaration, supra note 9.
33. See Du Ming, Explaining China's Tripartite Strategy Toward the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement, 18 J. INT'L EcON. L. 407, 424 (2015) ("After the USA
introduced the TPP and several ASEAN members joined the TPP negotiations, ASEAN
has been concerned that the USA might take away its leadership of Asian economic
integration and marginalize the Association. ASEAN's proposal for forming the RCEP in
2012 was at least partially motivated by this concern."); Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 13
(stating that, while China's dominant strategy "is to establish a regional framework that
does not include the United States so it can hold a dominant position," Japan seems to
have been "using the 'PRC card' to improve its TPP negotiation position vis-a-vis the
United States"); Michael Wesley, Who Calls the Thne? Asia Has to Dance to Duelling
Trade Agendas, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2014), https://theconversation.com/who-
calls-the-tune-asia-has-to-dance-to-duelling-trade-agendas-32813 [https://perma.cc/43MR-
CV9F] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) ("For Beijing, RCEP is a defensive measure against the
TPP. It is calculating that the lure of the size and dynamism of the Chinese economy will
convince the region to opt for a more 'Asianist' grouping, rather than the TPP's Pacific
model, which threatens to divide Asia's economic regionalism.").
34. See Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2, at 1132-63
(discussing the exclusion of China and India from the TPP negotiations).
35. See Yoo Choonsik, South Korea Moves Closer to Joining TPP Trade Talks,
REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-korea-trade-tpp-
idUSBRE9ASO6M20131129 [https://perma.cc/QLC6-QD9R] (archived Feb. 6, 2017)
[hereinafter South Korea Moves Closer to TPP Talks] (reporting that the South Korean
government "said it would make a final decision on whether to formally join the [TPP]
based on the outcome of talks with the member countries"); Alan Raybould, Thailand
Says to Join Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Talks, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/18/us-asia-obama-trade-idUSBRE8AHO6R2012
1118 [https://perma.cc/P6LD-J3FE] [hereinafter Thailand Says to Join TPP Talks]
(reporting Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra stating that Thailand would join
the TPP negotiations).
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Undoubtedly, there were both economic and non-economic reasons
for not inviting these countries to the TPP negotiations. 3 6 Yet, the
outcome was the same: while the excluded countries could still join the
TPP once it had been established, they would no longer be able to shape
the standards involved. Instead, they could only accept the final terms
as agreed upon by the original negotiating parties.3 7 Such an outcome
36. See Olivier Cattaneo, The Political Economy of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 28, 42-50 (Simon Lester &
Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009) (discussing how bilateral and regional agreements are
instruments of foreign policy that are primarily driven by political considerations); Chad
Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 39 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino
eds., 2006) [hereinafter REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND WTO] ("[Miany states enter
into RTAs [regional trade agreements] for important political, rather than exclusively
economic, considerations. In short, states are using economic means for political ends.").
Indeed, there were many strategic reasons for negotiating the TPP. As Paul Buchanan
observed:
[Flor the US, the [TPP Agreement] has strategic implications beyond trade per
se. The [Agreement] would provide the US with a trade-based counterbalance to
Chinese ambitions as well as a means by which to redress the current soft power
imbalance that favours the Chinese in the South Western Pacific. Beyond any
material benefits that accrued, the establishment of a US-led eight-country [now
twelve-country] trading bloc across the Pacific Rim, with potential to expand to
other APEC members, would help offset Chinese "chequebook diplomacy" as a
form of influence and leverage in that part of the world.
Paul G. Buchanan, Security Implications of the TPPA, in No ORDINARY DEAL:
UNMASKING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 82, 89 (Jane
Kelsey ed., 2010) [hereinafter NO ORDINARY DEAL]; see also Avery Goldstein, U.S. -China
Interactions in Asia, in TANGLED TITANS: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 263, 281
(David Shambaugh ed., 2012) ("[W]hen American support for realizing the TPP was
given a high priority two years later in conjunction with the November 2011 [APEC]
meetings in Honolulu, the prominence accorded the initiative was widely viewed as
having a new political significance related to the turbulence in U.S.-China relations
during the years following Obama's 2009 trip to China."); Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP,
supra note 23, at 226 (recalling the speech made by the chair of the House Ways and
Means Trade Subcommittee that "the TPP 'at least begins the process of positioning the
US as a counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific Region'); Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific
Perplexities, supra note 2, at 1146 ("[S]ome negotiating parties simply do not see the TPP
solely as a trade pact. Instead, they consider it as an important alliance that helps foster
regional security"); Jagdish Bhagwati, Deadlock in Durban, PROJECT-SYNDICATE (Nov.
30, 2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/ commentary/deadlock-in-durban
[https://perma.cc/JL4T-XMAN] (archived Feb. 20, 2017) (stating that TPP "will
principally aid countries that are worried about an aggressive China and seek political
security rather than increased trade").
37. As Shintaro Hamanaka explained:
Latecomers can be put in a disadvantageous position in two ways. While both
types of policies outlined below are usually implemented in the form of accession
conditionality, the two are different in nature. The first one is de facto
discrimination while the second is de jure discrimination:
Latecomers should accept the agenda and rules set by incumbents. Even if the
agenda and rules are equally applied to all parties, they are not always neutral.
682 [VOL, 50:-673
20171 THE RCEP AND TRANS-PACIFIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NORMS 683
was highly unattractive, if not unacceptable, to large Asian economies
such as China and India. It is therefore unsurprising that these
countries have turned their time, attention, and energy toward the
RCEP to develop regional standards based on their own preferences
and experiences.3 8
At the time of writing, ASEAN+6 members have already entered
into seventeen rounds of negotiations. Since the first round in May
2013 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, negotiations have
been held around the Asia-Pacific region-in Brisbane, Kuala Lumpur,
Nanning, Singapore, Greater Noida, Kyoto, Bangkok, Nay Pyi Taw,
Busan, Perth, Auckland, Ho Chi Minh City, Tianjin, Tangerang, and
Kobe. 3 Six ministerial meetings, including both regular and
intersessional, have also been held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Nay Pyi
Taw, Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur, Vientiane, and Cebu,
respectively.40
Although none of the draft negotiating texts have been officially
released, the leaked texts of some chapters have been made available
online by Knowledge Ecology International. Among these leaked drafts
are the October 15, 2015 version of the proposed RCEP intellectual
property chapter, 41 the original proposed intellectual property
Incumbents can set agenda and rules convenient to them, but not necessarily to
others.
Latecomers should satisfy additional requirements that were not required
from incumbents. They should endure disadvantageous conditions in order to be
accepted. Incumbents use additional requirements to tame newcomers and
reduce the rival's capability to assume leadership. Additional requirements may
include items outside the scope of the agreement.
Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 4 (footnote omitted).
38. See id. at 12-15 (analyzing the strategies of the key players in the TPP and
RCEP negotiations).
39. See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: News, DEP'T FOREIGN
AFF. & TRADE (Austl.), http://dfat.gov.aultrade/agreements/rcep/news/Pages/news.aspx
(last visited July 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/T7UF-W2A7] (archived Feb. 7, 2017)
[hereinafter RCEP News].
40. See id.
41. October 15 Draft, supra note 18; see also 2015 Oct 15 Version: RCEP IP
Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 19, 2016), http://keionline.org/node/2472
[https://perma.cc/C52G-PXSW] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter 2015 Oct 15 Version]
(providing the leaked October 15 text of the proposed RCEP intellectual property
chapter).
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chapters from ASEAN, 42 India,43 Japan,44 and South Korea,45 as well
as the proposed RCEP investment chapter. 46 Even though this
investment chapter does not focus specifically on intellectual property
issues, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism it seeks to
establish will have serious ramifications for regional intellectual
property developments.4 7
Once the RCEP Agreement is completed, the final text is
anticipated to cover a wide range of areas, including "trade in goods,
trade in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation,
intellectual property, competition [and] dispute settlement."48 Beyond
these areas, working or sub-working groups have also been established
42. ASEAN SECRETARIAT, CHAPTER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, REGIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP) FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Oct. 10,
2014), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RCEP-TNC6-WGIP3-ASEAN-Draft%20IP
%20Text-100ct2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/72GK-ZWKYJ (archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter
ASEAN's Draft]; see also 2014 Oct 10: ASEAN Proposals for RECP IP Chapter, Also
India, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (June 8, 2015), http://keionline.org/node/2241
[https://perma.cc/CK56-X74L] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter ASEAN Proposals for
RECP IP Chapter] (providing the leaked October 10 text of ASEAN's proposal).
43. GOV'T OF INDIA, WORKING DRAFT OF IPR CHAPTER FROM INDIA (Oct. 2014),
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/06-RCEP-TNC6-WGIP3-IN-IP-Draft.pdf [https://
perma.ccl2VMJ-KDXE] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter INDIA'S DRArr]; see also ASEAN
Proposals for RECP IP Chapter, supra note 42 (providing the leaked proposal from India).
44. Gov'T OF JAPAN, DRAFT TEXT ON AREAS NOT COVERED IN THE POSSIBLE
COMMON ELEMENTS FROM THE 2ND WGIP (Oct. 3, 2014), http://keionline.org/sites/default/
files/RCEPWGIPJP RevisedDraftText_30ct2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD4G-FXUR]
(archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter JAPAN'S DRAFT]; see also 2014 Oct 3 Version:
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Japan IPR Proposals, RCEP,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTL (Feb. 9, 2015), http://keionline.org/node/2173
[https://perma.cc/THG9-9RDT] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) (providing the leaked October 3
text of Japan's proposal).
45. Gov'T OF S. KOREA, REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
(RCEP) FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, DRAFT TEXT OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CHAPTER (Oct. 3, 2014), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RECP-IP-Chapter-
20140ct3.doc [https://perma.cc/8BWZ-TN5N] (archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter SOUTH
KOREA'S DRAFT]; see also 2014 Oct 3 Version: Korea Proposal for RECP IP Chapter
(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (June 3,
2015), http://keionline.org/node/2239 [https://perma.cc/ZG6Z-4E1IJM (archived Feb. 7,
2017) (providing the leaked October 3 text of South Korea's proposal).
46. RCEP DRAFT INVESTMENT TEXT (Oct. 16 draft), http://www.bilaterals.org/
IMG/docx/03-rcep-wgilO-draftconsolidated-investmenttext.docx [https://perma.cc/772F-
XDWM] (archived Feb. 15, 2017); see also 2015 Oct 16 Version: RCEP Draft Text for
Investment Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 21, 2016), http://keionline.org/
node/2474 [https://perma.cc/NS2R-CRC5] (archived Feb. 20, 2017) (providing the leaked
October 16 text of the draft RCEP investment chapter).
47. For the Author's discussions of investor-state dispute settlement, see
generally Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 2; Yu, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, supra note 2.
48. Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership pmbl. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/
agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-principles-rcep.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLP5-BZST]
(archived Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
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to address rules of origin; customs procedures and trade facilitation;
legal and institutional issues; sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment
procedures; electronic commerce; financial services; and
telecommunications.49
Given this large number of working and sub-working groups, it
remains to be seen whether the establishment of these groups will
result in the creation of standalone chapters in each specific area.
Regardless of the structural arrangement, the final agreement is likely
to be as ambitious as the TPP Agreement, whose final text contains
thirty different chapters. In light of this expansive and comprehensive
coverage, questions have already been raised about the potential
rivalry, compatibility, and complementarity between these two mega-
regional agreements.
III. THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
Although there are many reasons why mega-regional agreements
are being negotiated, a close study of the ongoing RCEP negotiations
and their contextual backgrounds suggests three possible scenarios in
which the agreement will help shape the trade and intellectual
property norms in the Asia-Pacific region. The first scenario occurs
when the RCEP becomes a rival pact to the TPP. The second scenario
takes place when the RCEP functions as a building block for the TPP,
the FTAAP, or other high-standards initiatives within the Asia-Pacific
region. The final scenario involves the RCEP serving as an alternative
path to the TPP. This path will not only rival the TPP-based path but
will also be quite different.
A. Rival Pact
When the TPP negotiations were first explored between the
United States and the four original members of the Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement 50 -namely, Brunei
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore-it was unclear
which other countries would be invited to the negotiations.5 1 At a later
49. See RCEP News, supra note 39 (reporting the formation of working and sub-
working groups).
50. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Brunei-Chile-
N.Z.-Sing., Aug, 2, 2005, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/FTAs-agreements-
in-force/P4/Full-text-of-P4-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERS9-EMQV] (archived Feb.
7, 2017).
51. As stated in President Obama's 2010 Trade Policy Agenda: "U.S.
participation in the TPP agreement is predicated on the shared objective of expanding
this initial group to include additional countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Several additional countries already have expressed initial interest in participating in
VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
stage, it was also intriguing to observe the terms under which the late-
arriving negotiating parties-namely, Canada, Mexico, and Japan-
would be allowed to negotiate the agreement. When these countries
requested to join the negotiations in the early 2010s, they had to agree
not to renegotiate chapters that had already achieved consensus
among the preexisting negotiating parties.52
the agreement." OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2010 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 146 (2010); see also Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 6 (noting that the
United States "wants the current negotiations to lead to a new agreement, rather than
[the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement] accepting the United
States as a latecomer").
52. As Inside U.S. Trade reported, Mexico had to accept the following conditions
in order to join the TPP negotiations:
First, Mexico agreed to accept all text on which the nine current TPP partners
have already reached consensus. That consensus text cannot be reopened unless
the nine current TPP partners agreed to revisit it, one official explained.
In addition, Mexico agreed to accept all future text on which the nine partners
reach consensus during the forthcoming 90-day window. This appears to reflect
the idea forwarded by some TPP observers earlier this week that new entrants
like Mexico will not have "veto authority" over the closing of some future TPP
chapters.
Mexico did not have a chance to review the past consensus text that it agreed
to accept as a condition of entry. Its current understanding is that it also will not
have access to any texts until it formally enters the talks, meaning that it will
also have to agree to text to which TPP partners agree during the 90-day period
without getting to review it first.
Mexico Stresses It Will Be a Full TPP Partner, Despite Terms of Entry, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, June 22, 2012. In regard to Canada, Michael Geist wrote:
1. According to Inside US Trade, the U.S. established two conditions for
Canadian entry. First, Canada will not be able to reopen any chapters where
agreement has already been reached among the current nine TPP partners. The
problem with this is that Canada has agreed to this condition without actually
gaining access to the current TPP text. Has Canada agreed to be bound by terms
it has not even read? Can it disclose what it has effectively agreed to simply by
accepting the offer to enter the negotiations?
2. Inside US Trade also reports that Canada has second tier status in the
negotiations as the U.S. has stipulated that Canada would not have "veto
authority" over any chapter. This means that should the other nine countries
agree on terms, Canada would be required to accept them. Has Canada agreed
to this condition? How will it deal with the prospect that the other nine countries
agree to terms that are disadvantageous to Canada?
Michael Geist, 2nd Tier Status for Canada?: 5 Questions on Canada's Entry to the Trans
Pacific Partnership Talks (June 19, 2012), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2012/06/tpp-entry/
[https://perma.cc/JPH7-G87R] (archived Feb. 6, 2017); accord Deborah Kay Elms, The
Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Negotiations: Some Outstanding Issues for the Final
Stretch, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 380 (2013) [hereinafter Elms,
TPP Trade Negotiations] ("Getting approval to participate did not mean ... that Japan
automatically became eligible to see all the negotiating texts or to sit in on bargaining
at the next round of discussions. Instead, Japan was forced to wait for the domestic
procedures in each TPP member country to be completed before it was allowed to
commence discussions with any of them."); see also Ann Capling & John Ravenhill, The
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Notwithstanding the commentators' usual focus on insiders in the
TPP negotiations, outsiders are equally important.5 3 Indeed, a recent
article of the Author has focused on the TPP outsiders.54 To be certain,
there are legitimate reasons why these outsiders were intentionally
excluded from the negotiations. In the case of China, for example, the
United States and other TPP partners might have been concerned that
including it would slow down the negotiations-or worse, would lead to
an impasse similar to what the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks
had experienced in the Doha Round.55 Those countries that sought to
use the TPP to isolate China, or to protect themselves against China's
growing economic and military might,56 also did not want China to be
part of the negotiations.57
TPP: Multilateralizing Regionalism or the Securitization of Trade Policy, in ,TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 23, at 279, 290 ("US Trade Representative declared
that 'potential new entrants must be prepared to address a range of US priorities and
issues'.").
53. See Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 1 ("[I]t is important to observe not only
which economies are included in a regional framework, but also which economies are
excluded from it. The distinct feature of TPP is that the PRC is excluded, and that of
RCEP is that the United States is excluded. While economists tend to emphasize
membership, namely who is in the group, what is politically more important in
understanding group formation is exclusion. This is because the exclusion of rival states
is necessary for countries seeking to assume leadership.").
54. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2.
55. See Du, supra note 33, at 417 ("From the US perspective, the only effect to
include China in the current negotiations is that the discussions will slow down and the
envisaged 'high standard' diluted to reflect less of US interests."); Yu, TPP and Trans-
Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2, at 1140 ("[I]f including China in the TPP negotiations
would slow down the discussions or create deadlocks similar to what the Doha Round
now experiences, it makes great strategic sense to exclude China from the negotiations-
or, at least, from the initial stages of these negotiations."); see also Tu Xinquan, China's
Position and Role in the Doha Round Negotiations, in CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE
GOVERNANCE: CHINA'S FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 167, 167
(Zeng Ka & Liang Wei eds., 2013) [hereinafter CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE]
(noting that "some Members and observers claim that China is the root cause of the
WTO's Doha fiasco").
56. For discussions of the so-called China threat, see generally CHINA'S FUTURE:
CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted Galen Carpenter & James A. Dorn
eds., 2000); BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TARGETS
AMERICA (2000); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA'S PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA AND
THE WORLD (2000); PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS: WHERE THEY WILL BE
FOUGHT AND How THEY CAN BE WON (2007).
57. See Buchanan, supra note 36, at 87 ("The strategic context in which the
proposed [TPP Agreement] is being negotiated is one where the People's Republic of
China is gradually challenging US military and economic primacy in the Western Pacific
amid a general military build-up throughout the region."); see also Wesley, supra note
33 (discussing the TPP and the RCEP in the context of "co-optive socialization"-an effort
to convert outsiders of the prevailing order into supporters by "welcoming rising powers
into regional institutions and being willing to shift representational and decision-making
structures to accommodate their interests, while demonstrating the material benefits
they received from existing arrangements").
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China might even have had its own reasons to stay outside of the
TPP negotiations. For instance, since its accession to the WTO in
December 2001,ss China has continued to struggle with many domestic
problems brought about by the WTO accession and the global economic
crisis.5 9 Under these circumstances, it might have been a good idea for
China to keep a low profile 60 and not to participate in the TPP
negotiations.6 ' After all, acceptance of some of the TPP chapters, such
58. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ANR9-
JV26] (archived Feb. 7, 2017).
59. As the Author noted in an earlier opinion piece:
China continues to face myriad challenges within its own economy, which
include massive urban migration, widespread unemployment and an enormous
gap between the rich and the poor. Although China has worked hard in the past
two decades to ensure compliance with WTO rules, the country may not be ready
for new and higher trade standards. These standards can be particularly
burdensome in view of the recent downturn of the Chinese economy.
Peter K. Yu, How China's Exclusion from the TPP Could Hurt Its Economic Growth,
FORTUNE (Oct. 19, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/19/china-exclusion-tpp-economic-
growth/ [https://perma.cc/TS5D-CEDX] (archived Feb. 6, 2017); see also Symposium,
China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 3 (2003)
(remarks of the Author) (noting that the rapid economic growth in China has brought
about many serious domestic problems, including "decreasing control by the state,
decentralization of the central government, significant losses suffered by inefficient
state-owned enterprises, the widening gap between the rich and the poor and between
the urban and rural areas, massive urban migration, widespread unemployment,
corruption, and growing unrest in both the cities and the countryside").
60. See Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World,
13 OR. REV. INT'L L. 209, 229-37 (2011) (discussing China's low profile in the
international intellectual property arena); see also Henry S. Gao, China's Participation
in the WTO: A Lawyer's Perspective, 11 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 41, 69 (2007) ("Be it in the
informal green room meetings, the formal meetings of the various committees and
councils or the grand sessions of the Ministerial Conferences, China has generally been
reticent.").
61. See CAMPBELL, supra note 3, at 268 (noting that "the TPP's standards are
too high for China to meet at his juncture"); JEFFREY J. SCHOTT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 58 (2012) (noting that "China is not ready to
implement and enforce the types of obligations under construction in the TPP
negotiations"); Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2, at 1134 ("At the
moment, China does not possess the necessary conditions to be further integrated into
what the [U.S. Trade Representative] referred to as 'a high-standard, 21st-century
[trade] agreement."') (footnote omitted); id. at 1149 ("Because China continues to
struggle with a wide variety of internal problems, its leaders may not be convinced that
the country is ready for further trade liberalization under the TPP.").
Nevertheless, the position taken by Chinese leaders may be slowly changing. As Du
Ming observed:
More recently, . . . China's attitude has been less suspicious [of the TPP]. An
increasing number of policy advisers are now openly calling for the Chinese
government to apply to join the TPP negotiations as early as possible. According
to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), China "will analyze the pros and cons
as well as the possibility of joining the TPP, based on careful research and
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as those on electronic commerce, government procurement, state-
owned enterprises, and telecommunications,62 would have been highly
problematic for China.63
Although it remains interesting and important to debate whether
China should be part of the TPP, one should not forget that many other
major Asian economies have also been left out of the TPP negotiations.
Whether they prefer to be or not, India, Indonesia, the Philippines,
South Korea, and Thailand are currently not part of the TPP.64 The
exclusion of these countries, along with China, is particularly
according to principles of equality and mutual benefit". Similarly, a spokesman
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "the Chinese side has an open-minded
attitude with regard to the TPP and other initiatives conducive to promoting
Asia-Pacific economic integration and common prosperity".
Du, supra note 33, at 415 (footnotes omitted).
62. TPP Agreement, supra note 1, ch. 13 (telecommunications), ch. 14 (electronic
commerce), ch. 15 (government procurement), ch. 17 (state-owned enterprises).
63. As the Author noted in an earlier article:
[Slome of the TPP standards, if adopted as reported, would present major
challenges to China. A case in point is the proposed government procurement
standards, which would drastically alter the structure and operation of state-
owned enterprises. ... The TPP's electronic commerce standards could also
deeply affect China's censorship and information control policy. This issue has
become especially sensitive in the trade context following China's losses before
both the WTO panel and the Appellate Body in China-Measures Affecting
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products.
Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2, at 1146; see also Du, supra note
33, at 418 ("Whenever China intends to join the TPP, China should be braced for the fact
that its accession to the TPP will not be easier than its WTO accession a decade ago, if
not more difficult and time consuming. Without being prepared to make huge
concessions and commit to extensive regulatory reforms, it is not possible for China to
be a member of the TPP."); Zhang Jianping, How Far Away Is China from the TPP?, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 30, at 66, 66
("[B]ehind-the-border issues-standards and certification, environmental protection,
intellectual property rights, labor standards, and government procurement-constitute
severe challenges to China's current management systems and mechanisms. In the short
term, China is not qualified to enter the TPP negotiations."); Gordon G. Chang, TPP vs.
RCEP: America and China Battle for Control of Pacific Trade, NAT'L INTEREST (Oct. 6,
2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-control-pacific-
trade-14021 [https://perma.cc/ZE3J-3LDE] (archived Feb. 6, 2017) ("Even if China could
somehow meet labor, food safety and environmental rules, it would have to adhere to
restrictions on the business activities of state enterprises, which would mean a
fundamental change in the Chinese economic model and permit wider internet access,
which would strike at the heart of the Communist Party's quasi-monopoly on
information.").
64. As Kurt Campbell, a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, noted, "already Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Thailand have expressed an interest in joining [the TPP]." CAMPBELL, supra note 3, at
195. During the TPP negotiations, South Korea and Thailand were invited to participate
in the TPP negotiations, but both of them declined. South Korea Moves Closer to TPP
Talks, supra note 35; Thailand Says to Join TPP Talks, supra note 35.
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problematic because they are crucial players in the Asia-Pacific
region.65
Moreover, trade rules can no longer be created in the developed
world and then shoved down the throats of large developing
countries.66 With the growing economic and geopolitical strengths of
China and India-and, for that matter, other emerging countries in the
region-these countries will simply refuse to support a system that
they did not help to shape.67 Indeed, the need to shape trade norms
based on their preferences was one of the primary reasons why large
Asian developing countries have been actively negotiating the RCEP.
As Shintaro Hamanaka noted,
the formation of regional integration and cooperation frameworks can be best
understood as a dominant state's attempt to create its own regional framework
where it can exercise some exclusive influence. . . . For an economy that wants
to increase its influence, establishing a regional group where it can be the most
powerful state-dominating other members in terms of material capacity-is
convenient. The most powerful state is likely to be influential in the group
because it can easily assume so-called "structural leadership," which is based on
material resources. While other factors such as knowledge can also be a source
of power, the exercise of power based on non-material resources is uncertain.
Thus, having the largest resources in a regional grouping is important to
increase the likelihood of attaining leadership. By assuming leadership, an
economy can set a favorable agenda and establish convenient rules. In addition,
the most powerful state can increase influence through prestige and asymmetric
economic interdependence with others.68
When all of this background is taken into consideration, it is easy
to understand why countries in the Asia-Pacific region have been eager
to develop a pact that could rival the TPP.69 Even more interesting, the
ongoing challenges to ratifying the TPP Agreement in the United
States and elsewhere have caused policymakers and commentators to
65. See Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2, at 1154-57
(discussing the exclusion of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea
from the TPP negotiations).
66. See Deborah Kay Elms, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Looking Ahead to
Next Steps, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 30,
at 9, 18 ("For China, in particular, joining the existing TPP with no opportunity at all for
discussing any of the existing provisions may present political difficulties at the domestic
level.").
67. See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE
WORLD NEEDS TO KNOW Now ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 139-40 (2006)
("China ... recognized the value of being at the table to shape the rules, rather than
having the rules imposed upon it."); Sam Nunn, Address to the American Assembly, in
LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 277, 285
(Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997) ("China will more likely to adhere to international norms that
it has helped to shape.").
68. Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 1-2 (footnote and citations omitted).
69. See supra note 33.
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begin wondering whether the RCEP would provide an attractive
alternative to the TPP.70
At this stage, it remains unclear whether the RCEP Agreement
will contain terms that are in direct conflict with the TPP Agreement
even though the existence of blatant conflicts is still highly unlikely.
After all, seven of the sixteen RCEP negotiating parties-or, to be more
precise, three and a half of the seven parties (Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and close to half of ASEAN)-are TPP partners. These
countries will therefore have strong incentives to ensure that they can
join the RCEP without violating the commitments made under the TPP
Agreement.7 1
Nevertheless, if conflicts do arise, they will precipitate what the
Author has described as the "battle of the FTAs [free trade
agreements]. "72 This battle will be problematic for not only developing
countries but also their developed counterparts. Juggling two very
different sets of standards within the same region will be costly,
inefficient, and highly challenging. Even more importantly, the
conflicts between the TPP and the RCEP will make Asia "a vital
battleground in setting the rules of the global economic order."73 As
President Obama declared after the conclusion of the TPP negotiations
in October 2015, "[w]hen more than 95 percent of our potential
customers live outside our borders, we can't let countries like China
write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules,
70. See Giovanni Di Lieto, If The TPP Dies, Australia Has Other Game Changing
Trade Options, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 4, 2016), https://theconversation.com/if-the-
tpp-dies-australia-has-other-game-changing-trade-options-64291 [https://perma.cc/P677-
97NJ] (archived Feb. 6, 2017) ("Given the TPP agreement may never enter into force due
to the uncertain political landscape in the US, Australia and the other six countries (New
Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam) that are members to both
the TPP and the RCEP are focusing their international trade policies on the latter
economic partnership."); Nicholas Ross Smith, China Will Be the Winner If US Backs
Out of the TPP, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 1, 2016), https://theconversation.com/china-
will-be-the-winner-if-us-backs-out-of-
The-tpp-63328 [https://perma.ccK4BQ-45K5] (archived Feb. 6, 2017) ("[I]f Clinton or
Trump make good on their pledge to torpedo the TPP if elected, the United States will
not only miss an opportunity to consolidate its position in Asia-Pacific, it will also allow
China to emerge as the uncontested trade power there.").
71. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential
Paths Toward Deeper Asian Economic Integration, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 359, 369-70 (2013) [hereinafter Lewis, TPP and RCEP] ("Of course there is
nothing to stop countries from seeking to join both the TPP and the RCEP, and several
countries in ASEAN seem inclined to do so by seeking to join the TPP.").
72. See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 1018-
27 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements] (discussing the undesirable future
"battles" among conflicting bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements).
73. CAMPBELL, supra note 3, at 267.
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opening new markets to American products while setting high
standards for protecting workers and preserving our environment."74
B. Building Block
The second scenario concerns the use of the RCEP as a building
block. When the RCEP negotiations were launched, there was a clear
understanding that the partnership would be used to facilitate the
development of the FTAAP. As noted in the Pathways to FTAAP and
the Beijing Roadmap, the FTAAP can be achieved through the TPP,
the RCEP, or other regional pathways.75 While the RCEP negotiating
parties may be less willing than the TPP partners to accept high trade
and intellectual property standards, there is no reason why lower
standards could not facilitate the development of the FTAAP.
Indeed, the existence of a low-standards regional pact is consistent
with the vision of the TPP architects, though not necessarily preferred
by them. Throughout the TPP negotiations, the United States and its
negotiating parties never once stated that the agreement would be
closed to other countries once it was finalized.76 Article 30.4.1 of the
TPP Agreement specifically states that the agreement
74. Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, WHITE HOUSE
(Oct. 5, 2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-
trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/AD7R-92TV] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
75. See Pathways to FTAAP, supra note 28, at 1 ("We believe that an FTAAP
should be pursued as a comprehensive free trade agreement by developing and building
on ongoing regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, among others."); Beijing Roadmap, supra note 29 ("The FTAAP should aim
to minimize any negative effects resulting from the proliferation of regional and bilateral
RTAs/FTAs, and will be pursued by building on current and developing regional
architectures. Greater efforts should be made to concluding the possible pathways to the
FTAAP, including the TPP and RCEP.").
76. President Obama's remarks, for example, suggested a "TPP first, China
later" approach: "[I]f we can get a trade deal with all the other countries in Asia that
says you've got to protect people's intellectual property[,] that will help us in our
negotiations with China." President Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President,
WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/10/08/
press-conference-president [https://perma.cc/FVF6-HPF9] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
Likewise, Hillary Clinton declared when she was Secretary of State: "We welcome the
interest of any nation willing to meet 21st century standards as embodied in the TPP,
including China." Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, Remarks at Singapore
Management University (Nov. 17, 2012), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/
texttrans/2012/11/20121117138825.html [https://perma.cc/RYP4-VMVP] (archived Feb.
6, 2017); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 3, 269 ("[I]f and when the TPP is passed, the
United States should work to encourage and assist in China's movement toward the
realization of the TPP's lofty entry requirements, with an aim of ultimately welcoming
China into the agreement. Because the TPP is aspirational rather than invitational, the
United States should make it clear that China's entry will be welcomed as long as it can
meet the agreement's tandards."); Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 52, at 292 ("Obama
identified the TPP as a 'potential model' for the entire region, thus melding together US
business interests and foreign policy interests to put pressure on China and others.");
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is open to accession by:
(a) any State or separate customs territory that is a member of APEC; and
(b) any other State or separate customs territory as the Parties may agree,
that is prepared to comply with the obligations in this Agreement . .. .77
It is one thing to say that countries that have been reluctant to accept
high standards are not allowed to participate in the negotiations, but
quite another thing to say that these countries will not be allowed to
join the final pact even if they promise to abide by the high standards
that are ultimately negotiated.78
As far as international negotiations are concerned, the building
block approach has been widely used in the negotiation of bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral agreements. For example, Jason Kearns
found that the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 7
reflected "a 'building block' approach: first ensuring that countries
accede to the WTO, then negotiating trade and investment agreements
with individual countries in the region (such as the Agreement with--'
Morocco), and finally reaching a comprehensive United States-Middle
East Free Trade Area."80 Likewise, Chia Siow Yue and Hadi Soesastro
declared that "[t]he Singapore government views FTAs as building
blocks towards global and APEC freer trade. Formation of bilateral
FTAs among like-minded partners is seen as a way to avoid the.
problem in which the pace of trade liberalization is held back
unnecessarily."8 1
From a standpoint of regional or international norm setting, the
use of a building block approach can be very effective. Virtually all
negotiating parties to an FTA belong to other FTAs or regional
networks.82 By engaging in the development of an ever-growing web of
SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 61, at 58 ("We see little evidence to support the notion that
China is being excluded as part of a broader containment strategy.").
77. TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 30.4.1.
78. See CAMPBELL, supra note 3, at 195 (noting that "TPP is an open-platform
agreement that allows any country to join if it can meet the appropriate standards");
C.L. Lim et al., What Is "High-Quality, Twenty-First Century" Anyway?, in TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 23, at 3, 3 ("[The TPP] is an open-ended agreement
that clearly contemplates an expanded membership over time.").
79. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text
[https://perma.cc/284Q-HSJ2] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
80. Jason Kearns, United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, in BILATERAL
AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 144, 146 (Simon Lester & Bryan
Mercurio eds., 2009) [hereinafter BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE
STUDIES].
81. Chia Siow Yue & Hadi Soesastro, ASEAN Perspective on Promoting Regional
and Global Freer Trade, in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 22, at 190, 198.
82. See Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit [hereinafter Gao,
RTA Strategy], in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL,
PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 53, 60 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008)
[hereinafter CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE] (discussing China's focus on
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FTAs, the participating countries can help establish norms that will
eventually be consolidated in a multilateral setting.83 As Ruth Okediji
pointed out, countries may seek to "consolidate and (perhaps improve)
the gains from bilateralism" once they have developed a network of
bilateral agreements that is sufficiently dense for that purpose.84 Cho
Sungjoon concurred: "[R]egionalism may contribute to multilateralism
under certain circumstances through a 'laboratory effect'. After
experiencing trial and error as well as learning-by-doing in the regional
level, countries may feel confident in ratcheting these regional
initiatives up to the multilateral forum."8 5
This building block approach has also been widely used in the
intellectual property field. The negotiation of many key international
intellectual property agreements, for instance, began with mini-
negotiations between a small group of key, and often like-minded,
negotiations with those who are already members of other RTAs). Indeed, countries have
used FTAs as entry points to regional or plurilateral networks. As the Author explained
in an earlier article:
Strategically, FTAs and [economic partnership agreements] provide important
entry points into other regional or plurilateral networks. In doing so, they allow
developed countries to explore interstate relationships with a smaller number of
countries. Such an arrangement helps reduce the complexity and high costs of
negotiation with a large number of parties or a complex regional body. The
negotiation of the agreements also helps countries test the feasibility of applying
specific models to a particular region. In fact, because the agreements involve
self-selected parties, they allow parties to avoid negotiation of issues that would
require them to make concessions that are important to their domestic
constituencies. The exclusion of issues will also quicken the negotiation process,
as those issues tend to slow down, if not derail, the negotiations.
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 72, at 970-71; see also Sidney Weintraub,
Lessons from the Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements, in FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 79, 79 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) (noting
that the United States' free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore were "intended
to be bellwethers for future FTAs in both regions, some bilateral and others plurilateral,
as well as to set the substantive parameters for the hemispherewide Free Trade Area of
the Americas").
83. See Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements,
22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 21-22 (1989) (contending that a bilateral agreement may
"provide at least a partial model for a future multilateral agreement"); IQsensato, The
Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Global Policy Implications, IN
FOCUS, June 2, 2008, at 4 ("What appears as plurilateral in the beginning will quickly
become a global standard through FTAs and [economic partnership agreements] and
through political and economic pressure.").
84. Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International
Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 143 (2004).
85. Cho Sungjoon, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 238
(2004) (footnote omitted); accord Guy de Jonquikres, Comment, in FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 30, 32 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004)
[hereinafter FTA STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES] (noting that FTAs "push forward the
frontiers by acting as laboratories for WTO-plus innovations").
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players before the negotiations were extended to other members of the
international community. A case in point is the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property RightS86 (TRIPS Agreement),
whose negotiations began with trilateral discussions between the
European Communities (now the European Union), Japan, and the
United States (along with their industries).8 7 Other good but much
earlier examples are the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property88 (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works89 (Berne Convention). As
Bryan Mercurio recounted in regard to these two cornerstone
agreements,
[bly the mid-1800s . . . trading nations had created a complex web of agreements
in which [most-favored-nation and national treatments] applied bilaterally.
When the "spaghetti bowl" agreements became unmanageable, practitioners and
government[s] realized the rights needed to be formally adopted in an
international framework. Such efforts built upon the bilateralism by filling gaps
and providing coherence to [intellectual property rights]. This process
culminated in the Paris Convention ... and the Berne Convention. ... 90
This building block approach was even considered at the early
stages of the ACTA negotiations. As revealed in an early discussion
paper, which was presumably advanced by the United States and
subsequently leaked online, a key negotiating party proposed to
conduct the negotiations in two phases:
In the initial phase, it is important to join a number of interested trading
partners in setting out the parameters for an enforcement system that will
function effectively in today's environment. As a second phase, other countries
will have the option to join the agreement as part of an emerging consensus in
favor of a strong [intellectual property] enforcement standard.91
86. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
87. See generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002) (discussing the trilateral intellectual property
negotiations between the European Communities, Japan, and the United States before
slowly multilateralizing their consolidated positions); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC LAW 96-120 (2003) (discussing the role of Japanese, EU, and the U.S. intellectual
property industries and the Intellectual Property Committee in the TRIPS negotiations).
88. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967).
89. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 7(1),
Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971)
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
90. Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND WTO, supra note 36, at 215, 217.
91. DISCUSSION PAPER ON A PROPOSED ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT 1, 1 (2007), http://cryptome.orglacta/acta-proposal-2007.pdf [https://perma.
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Although the ACTA negotiations were eventually conducted in a
single phase, the final agreement was opened for signature to those
countries that were not involved in the negotiations. 92 To a large
extent, ACTA reflected this building block approach.
C. Alternative Path
Since the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2008,
commentators and the media have begun to question the
appropriateness of the Washington Consensus, which features a set of
policy recommendations concerning fiscal deficits, public expenditure
priorities, tax reform, interest rates, the exchange rate, trade policy,
foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property
rights. 9 The Washington Consensus is directly relevant to the
intellectual property context because it is the model enshrined in the
TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
agreements. As Neil Netanel noted,
[t]he [World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)] Development
Agenda . . . reflects developing countries' growing resistance to the upward
harmonization of [intellectual property] protection required by the TRIPS and
subsequent "TRIPS-plus" bilateral free trade agreements .... [It] should be
understood as part of a broad, multipronged rejection of the "Washington
cc/5Y86-K97A] (archived Feb. 26, 2017); see also Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open)
Fears ofACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 1071-72 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears]
(discussing the two-step process). It remains unclear which countries that the
negotiating parties would suggest to target at the second phase. Nevertheless, a
confidential U.S. government cable disclosed through WikiLeaks stated:
The GOJ [Government of Japan] sees the most likely candidates for the first
tranche including France, UK, Germany, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore.
The GOJ sees Italy and Canada s countries which should be approached in the
second group, but [Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris] Moore explained potential
difficulties with Canada, and pushed for the inclusion of developing countries
such as Jordan and Morocco in the first tranche, too. These countries had
accepted high IPR [intellectual property right] standards in their FTA's with the
U.S.
Michael Geist, Japan Wanted Canada Out of Initial ACTA Group, MICHAEL GEIST'S
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.michaelgeist.calcontent/view/5656/125/. [https://perma.
cc/5Q5K-44J8] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
92. See ACTA, supra note 16, art. 39 ("This Agreement shall remain open for
signature by participants in its negotiation, and by any other WTO Members the
participants may agree to by consensus, from 1 May 2011 until 1 May 2013.").
93. See generally John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform,
in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson
ed., 1990) (identifying the economic policies Washington encouraged other states to
adopt in Latin America).
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Consensus" that shunted aside the [New International Economic Order] and
came to dominate development policy in the 1980s and early 1990s.94
Providing a sharp contrast to this Washington Consensus9 5 is
what Joshua Ramo, the former Time foreign editor, has coined the
"Beijing Consensus":9 6
[The Beijing Consensus] is simply three theorems about how to organise the
place of a developing country in the world, along with a couple of axioms about
why the physics is attracting students in places like New Delhi and Brasilia. The
first theorem repositions the value of innovation. Rather than the "old-physics"
argument that developing countries must start development with trailing-edge
technology (copper wires), it insists that on the necessity of bleeding-edge
innovation (fiber optic) to create change that moves faster than the problems
change creates. In physics terms, it is about using innovation to reduce the
friction-losses of reform.
The second Beijing Consensus theorem is that since chaos is impossible to
control from the top you need a whole set of new tools. It looks beyond measures
like per-capita GDP and focuses instead o[n] quality-of-life, the only way to
manage the massive contradictions of Chinese development. This second
theorem demands a development model where sustainability and equality
become first considerations, not luxuries. Because Chinese society is an unstable
stew of hope, ambition, fear, misinformation and politics only this kind of chaos-
theory can provide meaningful organization.
Finally, the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one
that stresses using leverage to move big, hegemonic powers that may be tempted
to tread on your toes.97
Although one could debate whether the Beijing Consensus-or
what Chinese commentators have described modestly as the "Beijing,
proposal"9 8 -actually provides a coherent model, or even whether that
model is desirable, there is no denying that this model has earned great
admiration throughout the developing world. In recent years, for
instance, "government research teams from Iran to Egypt, Angola to
Zambia, Kazakhstan to Russia, India to Vietnam and Brazil to
Venezuela have been crawling around the Chinese cities and
countryside in search of lessons from Beijing's experience."99
94. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Introduction: The WIPO Development Agenda and
Its Development Policy Context, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 2-3 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009).
95. See MARK LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 134 (2008) ("[F]or the first
time since the end of the Cold War, Europe and America face a formidable alternative:
the Chinese model.").
96. JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS (2004).
97. Id. at 11-12. For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally id.;
STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: How CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL
WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010).
98. HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER 17 (2011).
99. LEONARD, supra note 95, at 122; see also HALPER, supra note 97, at 31 (noting
"a growing number of developing nations that are loosely connected by an admiration for
China"); Stephen Marks, Introduction to AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 1,
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While the Beijing Consensus may not promote democratic
societies and civil liberties-the conditions often demanded by the
Washington Consensus-the Chinese model shows a pragmatic
approach and the government leaders' willingness to consider a wide
variety of options.10 0 As Deborah Brautigam noted,
[a]t the end of the day, we should remember this: China's own experiments have
raised hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, largely without foreign aid.
They believe in investment, trade, and technology as levers for development, and
they are applying these same tools in their African engagement, not out of
altruism but because of what they learned at home. . . . These lessons emphasize
not aid, but experiments; not paternalism, but the "creative destruction" of
competition and the green shoots of new opportunities.101
African analysts also appreciate that "China understands the
challenges of governing in areas where the bulk of the population lives
in abject poverty." 102 Indeed, China's developing-country status
suggests that "the means and methods employed in Chinese
operations . . . are more likely to provide appropriate models and more
instructive experiences in the conditions of underdevelopment, lack of
basic infrastructures and other current technical incapacities."1 0 3
In addition to the Beijing Consensus, ASEAN has also brought to
the RCEP negotiations a unique style of negotiation. Commonly
referred to as the "ASEAN Way," negotiations involving ASEAN
members are conducted in "a process of regional interactions and
cooperation based on discreteness, informality, consensus building and
non-confrontation styles which are often contrasted with the
adversarial posturing, majority vote and other legalistic decision-
11 (Firoze Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007) (citing Nigerians' appreciation of the
Chinese model for providing stability and visionary leadership).
100. As William Overholt explained:
Chinese leaders . . . do not accept Western democratic ideology, but they accept
individual practices, such as village elections, because those practices have
specific pragmatic value in reducing corruption. They want to discover and test
these things themselves, step by step, rather than succumb to foreign ideological
browbeating, but they are willing to consider nearly everything.
WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, ASIA, AMERICA, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF GEOPOLITICS 118
(2007).
101. DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON'S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN
AFRICA 311-12 (2011).
102. Hany Besada, The Implications of China's Ascendancy for Africa 24 (Ctr. for
Int'l Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 40, 2008),
http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Paper_40-web.pdf [https://perma.ccEZV5-
V5F8] (archived Feb. 2, 2017).
103. Dot Keet, South-South Strategic Bases for Africa to Engage China, in THE
RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL
INTERVENTIONS 21, 28 (Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds. 2010).
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making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations."104 While
this harmonious approach to regional cooperation has facilitated
diplomacy and enhanced security in Southeast Asia, it has also slowed
down the negotiation process, resulting in what Mark Beeson has
described as "accommodating the slowest ship in the convoy." 0 5
Thus far, all the RCEP negotiating parties have bilateral
agreements with ASEAN. 0 6 Principle 6 of the Guiding Principles and
Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (Guiding Principles) explicitly stated the following:
Any ASEAN FTA Partner that did not participate in the RCEP negotiations at
the outset would be allowed to join the negotiations, subject o terms and
conditions that would be agreed with all other participating countries. The RCEP
agreement will also have an open accession clause to enable the participation of
any ASEAN FTA partner that did not participate in the RCEP negotiations and
any other external economic partners after the completion of the RCEP
negotiations.107
Thus, "having signed an FTA with ASEAN is the precondition for
participation in RCEP negotiations."0 8
The preamble of the Guiding Principles stated further that the
RCEP negotiations "will recognize ASEAN Centrality in the emerging
regional economic architecture and the interests of ASEAN's FTA
Partners in supporting and contributing to economic integration,
equitable economic development and strengthening economic
104. AMITAV ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: ASEAN AND THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER 63 (3d ed. 2014); see also BEESON,
INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 20, at 2 (describing the "ASEAN Way" as
an "informal, consensus-based approach to international cooperation"); BEESON,
REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 20, at 219 (noting that there is "very little
chance of regional elites losing 'face' in processes conducted in the ASEAN Way);
JURGEN HAACKE, ASEAN's DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY CULTURE: ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 7 (2003) ("ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture
comprises six core norms: sovereign equality, non-recourse to the use of force and the
peaceful settlement of conflict, non-interference and non-intervention, non-involvement
of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, quiet diplomacy,
and mutual respect and tolerance"). See generally ACHARYA, supra note 104 (providing
an excellent discussion of ASEAN's distinctive approach to political and security co-
operation). But see id. at 63 (conceding that the "ASEAN Way" is "a loosely used concept
whose meaning remains vague and contested"); BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-
PACIFIC, supra note 20, at 22 (discussing criticism that "the ASEAN way of voluntarism
and consensus . .. has made it primarily an organization dedicated to conflict avoidance
rather than resolution"); BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 20, at
88 ("ASEAN is primarily a mechanism for sidelining problems regional leaders consider
politically too difficult or sensitive.").
105. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 20, at 32.
106. See Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 11 ("[Elconomies without an FTA with
ASEAN (such as the United States) cannot participate in RCEP negotiations.").
107. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, Principle 6.
108. Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 11.
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cooperation among the participating countries." 109 If the RCEP is
indeed centered on ASEAN and negotiated in the ASEAN Way, the
final agreement is likely to be very different from the one negotiated
by the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
Singapore, and other like-minded countries.
Notwithstanding the possibility of having an alternative path
colored by the Beijing Consensus, the ASEAN Way, or both, the
detailed provisions in the leaked drafts of the RCEP intellectual
property and investment chapters seem to suggest that the final
agreement is unlikely to provide the alternative path that many
policymakers, commentators, and civil society organizations have
hoped for. Indeed, commentators were considerably disappointed by
the close resemblances between the draft RCEP intellectual property
chapter and the TPP intellectual property chapter. As Jeremy Malcolm
declared,
[w]e might ... expect that [the] RCEP could be the "anti-TPP"; a vehicle for
countries to push back against the neo-colonial ambitions of the United States,
by proposing alternative, home-grown standards on the TPP's thorniest issues
such as copyright, patents, and investor protection. Some members of RCEP
have indeed spoken out against the TPP because of its unbalanced promotion of
strict copyright and patent laws, and some commentators have characterized
RCEP and the TPP as competitors.
But based on [the] leaks, the promise of [the] RCEP pushing back against the
TPP is being squandered. Instead, its [intellectual property] chapter is turning
out as a carbon copy. The text for the chapter that South Korea proposes, which
[Knowledge Ecology International] rightly and succinctly describes as "terrible",
calls for many of the same provisions and more . .. .110
The limited distinction between the TPP and RCEP intellectual
property chapters is understandable considering that the developed-
109. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, pmbl.; see also Yoshifumi Fukunaga,
ASEAN's Leadership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 2 ASIA &
PAC. POL'Y STUD. 103 (discussing ASEAN's leadership in the RCEP negotiations).
Shintaro Hamanaka, however, had reservation about the effectiveness of the ASEAN-
centered approach:
RCEP recognizes "ASEAN centrality," though this is conveniently interpreted by
the PRC to exclude the United States since it does not have an FTA with ASEAN.
On the other hand, ASEAN's centrality would not be assured inside RCEP,
where it could possibly be sidelined by larger and more powerful economies such
as the PRC and Japan. In the case of TPP, little attention is paid to ASEAN
centrality and only some ASEAN members are involved in TPP negotiations at
this stage.
Hamanaka, supra note 23, at 14 (footnote and citations omitted).
110. Jeremy Malcolm, Meet RCEP, a Trade Agreement in Asia That's Even Worse
Than TPP or ACTA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOuND. (June 4, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/06/just-when-you-thought-no-trade-agreement-could-be-
worse-tpp-meet-rcep [https://perma.cc/STD7-2EQF] (archived Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter
Malcolm, Meet RCEP].
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country participants in the RCEP negotiations, such as Australia,
Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea, have very strong
incentives to push for the high intellectual property standards that
have now been enshrined in the TPP Agreement. While South Korea is
technically outside of the TPP, it also has similar incentives, due
largely to its FTA with the United States.11' Being one of the latest
U.S. FTAs, the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement contains
very high standards of intellectual property protection and
enforcement, along with side confirmation letters covering online
piracy prevention and limitations on Internet service provider
liability.112
D. Summary
In sum, there are three different scenarios in which the RCEP
Agreement can help shape the trade and intellectual property norms
in the Asia-Pacific region. While the leaked drafts of the various TPP
chapters have revealed that the alternative path scenario is very
unlikely to take place, it remains to be seen whether the RCEP will
serve as a rival or complementary pact. At this stage, it is also unclear
whether the RCEP, the TPP, or both will become a building block for
the FTAAP, especially following the United States' withdrawal.
Moreover, both the rival pact and building block scenarios could
happen at the same time.113 Just as the RCEP threatens to rival the
TPP, the two trade pacts could also work in tandem to help facilitate
the development of the FTAAP-for example, by including the lowest
common denominators of the two pacts. The possibility of these two
111. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., Dec. 3, 2010,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [https://
perma.cc/73AU-7U8E] (archived Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter KORUS FTA].
112. See Peter K. Yu, Trade Agreement Cats and the Digital Technology Mouse, in
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: BALANCING COMPETING
INTERESTS 185, 194-96 (Bryan Mercurio & Ni Kuei-Jung eds., 2014) (discussing the
intellectual property provisions of the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement).
113. As Shujiro Urata declared:
[Tihe RCEP and the TPP can be complementary and coexist, and they do not
need to merge to become an FTAAP. Indeed, one may regard these two regional
frameworks as two stages to reach an FTAAP, an eventual goal of regional
integration in the Asia Pacific, while the RCEP may eventually develop into an
East Asian Economic Community. Developing economies in East Asia may
participate in the RCEP first, and they may join the TPP when they have grown
economically and are ready to accept high-standard economic rules. In order for
this approach to be realized, both the RCEP and the TPP need to accept new
members that are qualified to join.
Shujiro Urata, A Stages Approach to Regional Economic Integration in Asia Pacific: The
RCEP, TPP, and FTAAP, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,
supra note 30, at 119, 128-29 [hereinafter Urata, A Stages Approach].
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pacts working together is further strengthened by the positions stated
in the Pathways to FTAAP and the Beijing Roadmap,114 as well as by
the beliefs of many that the two pacts will eventually merge.11 5
Such a merger is not too far-fetched considering that no ASEAN
member-or, for that matter, Australia, New Zealand, or any other
RCEP negotiating party1 6-wants to pick between the United States
and its powerful Asian neighbors. 117 This difficult choice will be
obvious if the TPP moves forward and if China and India continue to
remain outside of the pact. Many ASEAN+6 members and their
industries simply cannot afford to have two expansive yet conflicting
114. See Pathways to FTAAP, supra note 28 (noting that the FTAAP should
"build[] on ongoing regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, among others"); Beijing Roadmap, supra note 29 (including both the
TPP and the RCEP among "the possible pathways to the FTAAP").
115. See CAMPBELL, supra note 3, at 193 ("For many in Asia, both the TPP and
the RCEP are way stations on the path to the ultimate destination."); Matthew P.
Goodman, US Economic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Promoting Growth, Rules,
and Presence, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note
30, at 174-75 ("[T]he TPP and the RCEP could one day converge in a region-wide
agreement, or at least become interoperable, with enormous potential gains to world
income."); Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 23, at 235 ("An analyst with the Asian
Development Bank has predicted that ASEAN+6 and the TPP will ultimately merge
together."); Robert Scollay, The TPP and RCEP: Prospects for Convergence, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 30, at 235 ("An
expectation that the FTAAP will evolve from the trans-Pacific and East Asian tracks
[referring to the TPP and the RCEP, respectively] naturally implies that the two tracks
will converge at some point, although no process has yet been mapped out. .
116. As Ann Capling and John Ravenhill recounted:
In November, it was reported that Australia and New Zealand: "have had to
communicate to key figures supporting the TPP [in Washington] in no uncertain
terms that the moment New Zealand and Australia smell a China containment
policy, they are 'gone' from the negotiations". Such views are likely to be shared
by other TPP members that have important trade, investment and political
relationships with China, and who do not want these to be held hostage to US
foreign policy concerns.
Capling & Ravenhill, supra note 52, at 293.
117. See Ellen L. Frost, China's Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or
Threat?, in CHINA'S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 105 (William W. Keller
& Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007) (noting that Asian countries "do not wish to be forced
to choose between Beijing and Washington"); David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise
of China and Asia's New Dynamics, in POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA'S NEW DYNAMICS
17 (David Shambaugh ed., 2006) ("Having to choose between Beijing and Washington as
a primary benefactor is the nightmare scenario for the vast majority of Asian states ....
It is not an exaggeration that all Asian states seek to have sound, extensive, and
cooperative relations with both the United States and China, and thus will do much to
avoid being put into a bipolar dilemma."); Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra
note 2, at 1151 ("[M]any countries in the Asia-Pacific region remain reluctant to pick
between China and the United States despite their concern about China's growing
economic and military strengths.").
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sets of regional trade and trade-related standards.118 At some point,
they will have to decide whether they want to focus on one or the other.
As Meredith Kolsky Lewis observed,
[the merger of the TPP and the RCEP] is a definite possibility. It is hard to
envision economies such as India or China agreeing in the near-term to the
comprehensive liberation on trade in goods that acceding to the TPP would
entail. At the same time, it also does not seem realistic that in the long-term
there will be an FTAAP that does not include China. Furthermore, should
Korea . . . agree to join the TPP, it would not be in China's interest to remain on
the outside. . . . [Thus, i]t is possible that these competing considerations will
coalesce via an ultimate melding together of the TPP with ASEAN+6, such that
non-TPP members of ASEAN+6 phase in their commitments over a longer and
later time period.119
Indeed, for many policymakers and commentators, it is difficult to
imagine a comprehensive trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region
without China's participation. As Lim Chin Leng, Deborah Elms, and.
Patrick Low observed,
[i]f the ultimate goal of the TPP is to expand to the FTAAP, then the TPP will
have to include China. If the TPP is serious about expanding trade cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific, then the TPP ought to include China at some point in the
future. This is not to say that China needs to participate in the negotiations at
th[e] initial stage. But it is to suggest that China's involvement should be
118. See Lewis, TPP and RCEP, supra note 71, at 369-70 ("[P]articularly for.
countries with limited human and financial resources for negotiations and those outside
the Asia-Pacific, it will probably be the case that countries will seek to join [the TPP or
the RCEP] rather than both."); Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2, at
1177 ("Although more than half of the TPP negotiating parties (Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam) are also
negotiating the RCEP, countries are unlikely to have the ability, resources, and
sustained interest in actively developing two rather similar trade pacts in the same
region.").
119. Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 23, at 235. Deborah Elms, by contrast,
expressed skepticism over such a merger:
Of course, a lot will ultimately depend on what happens with RCEP and the level
of ambition shown. From the beginning however, a merger is already looking
tricky. For instance, RCEP explicitly allows special and differential treatment
for developing economies, while the TPP does not. The TPP mandates are much
broader and deeper than the agenda drawn up by the 16 RCEP parties. It is
highly likely that, at the end of the day, the TPP members will be reluctant to
drop down the level of ambition in the TPP to meet the RCEP or that RCEP
members will come up much farther to meet the TPP.
[E]ven if a merger of some sort were possible between RCEP and the TPP,
creating a 21 member [preferential trade agreement] in such a fashion would
likely be a poor way to draft an agreement. Docking on and massaging existing
commitments to fit a new environment is less likely to deliver maximum benefits
to all parties than a new agreement negotiated from the beginning.
Elms, TPP Trade Negotiations, supra note 52, at 396-97.
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planned for and that steps should be taken to make it more-and not less-likely
that China will join in the future.120
With China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and
Thailand lying outside of the TPP, the benefits of this regional pact
have been significantly curtailed.12 1 As the economic modeling work of
Peter Petri, Michael Plummer, and Zhai Fan has shown,
[b]y 2025, the TPP track would yield global annual benefits of $295 billion and
the Asian track [of regional initiatives in Northeast and Southeast Asia] $500
billion. The benefits from regionwide free trade-the grand prize involving the
consolidation of the tracks-would reach $1,922 billion, or 1.9 percent of world
GDP.122
IV. DRAFT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHAPTER
Thus far, this Article has focused primarily on the RCEP as a
mega-regional agreement. The remainder of this Article discusses
more specifically the intellectual property norms that are being
established through the RCEP.
When ASEAN leaders adopted the RCEP Framework in
November 2011, it was unclear-at least to outsiders-whether the
agreement would include an intellectual property chapter. The
potential omission of such a chapter was plausible, considering the
120. C.L. Lim et al., Conclusion, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 23,
at 319, 325; see also SCHOTT ET AL., supra note 61, at 55 ("It is hard to conceive of a
comprehensive Asia-Pacific trade arrangement hat does not eventually include
China."); Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 23, at 235 ("[I]t ... does not seem
realistic that in the long-term there will be an FTAAP that does not include China.").
121. As Sebastian Herreros declared:
Ultimately, the TPP will have to expand to include large, mostly Asian
economies, to be a meaningful exercise. Its current commercial appeal is very
modest, given the small size of most participating economies. More importantly,
an agreement limited to the . .. nine [and now twelve] participants would be far
from a credible platform for large-scale trans-Pacific economic integration.
Sebastian Herreros, Coping with Multiple Uncertainties: Latin America in the TPP
Negotiations, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 23, at 260, 274; see also Lewis,
Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 23, at 226 ("[T]he United States' interest in the
Agreement was clearly tied to its potential to expand. This remains the case today, as
the other countries that have joined the negotiation also provide little in the way of new
market access opportunities for the US."); Kimberlee Weatherall, The TPP as a Case
Study of Changing Dynamics for International Intellectual Property Negotiations, in
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 50, 60 (Tania Voon ed., 2014) ("[T]he economic
benefits of a TPP between the negotiating parties would be limited; only if bigger regional
economies participate, such as India, South Korea, and China, will these negotiations
generate a real payoff.").
122. PETER A. PETRI ET AL., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AND ASIA-PACIFIC
INTEGRATION: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 35 (2012).
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wide variation in intellectual property protection and enforcement
among ASEAN+6 members.123
By the time ASEAN leaders adopted the Guiding Principles in
August 2012, however, it became clear that the RCEP Agreement
would contain an intellectual property chapter, or at least some
intellectual property provisions. As Part V of the Guiding Principles
declared, "the text on intellectual property in the RCEP will aim to
reduce [intellectual property]-related barriers to trade and investment
by promoting economic integration and cooperation in the utilization,
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights."1 24
At the third round of the RCEP negotiations in Kuala Lumpur in
January 2014, the negotiators finally agreed to establish a working
group on intellectual property. As shown by leaked documents,
ASEAN, India, Japan, and South Korea began submitting draft
negotiating texts for the proposed intellectual property chapter only
shortly before the sixth round of the RCEP negotiations in Greater
Noida, India in December 2014.125 According to the brief meeting notes
that the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides
online, this negotiation round-which followed immediately from the
Second RCEP Ministerial Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar-was the
first time the working groups "made progress on draft chapter text."126
It is therefore very likely that draft negotiating texts only began to
emerge at this stage, even though the meeting notes did mention that
intellectual property issues were discussed as early as the second
round.
At the time of writing, the draft text of the RCEP intellectual
property chapter had not yet been officially released. Nevertheless,
several documents have already been leaked to the public via the
Internet. Based on the latest leaked draft text, dated October 15, 2015,
the intellectual property chapter may include thirteen sections: (1)
general provisions and basic principles, (2) copyright and related
rights, (3) trademarks, (4) geographical indications, (5) patents, (6)
industrial designs, (7) genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and
123. See Peter K. Yu, Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law and
Policy, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 147, 148 (Christoph Antons ed., 2017)
("The intellectual property developments in Asia are dynamic, distinct and diverse.
These developments have also been highly uneven, not to mention changing rapidly.
What we see today consists of largely works in progress."); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 339-70 (2012) (discussing
the difficulty in locating any distinct values, approaches, or practices concerning
intellectual property law and policy or identifying any established pan-Asian positions in
this area).
124. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, pt. V.
125. See ASEAN's DRAFT, supra note 42; INDIA'S DRAFT, supra note 43; JAPAN'S
DRAFT, supra note 44; SOUTH KOREA'S DRAFT, supra note 45.
126. RCEP News, supra note 39.
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folklore, (8) unfair competition, (9) enforcement of intellectual property
rights, (10) cooperation and consultation, (11) transparency, (12)
transitional period and transitional arrangements, and (13) procedural
matters.127
Although this Part does not offer detailed explorations of each
section, it highlights the key provisions concerning the four main
branches of intellectual property law, as well as the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. When analyzing the draft RCEP
intellectual property chapter, it is worth recalling that other draft
RCEP chapters, such as those on investment and electronic commerce,
could include provisions relevant to intellectual property rights. The
TPP investment chapter, for instance, became highly controversial
after Eli Lilly and Philip Morris used similar investor-state dispute
settlement mechanisms in bilateral or regional trade agreements to
address their intellectual property disputes.128
A. Copyright
In the area of copyright and related rights, the draft RCEP
intellectual property chapter includes the usual FTA language
requiring accession to the two WIPO Internet Treaties-the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty.129 Going beyond the terms of the TPP Agreement, the draft
chapter also requires accession to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual
Performances, 1 3 0 the International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
127. October 15 Draft, supra note 18.
128. For discussions of the Eli Lilly case, see generally Brook K. Baker & Katrina
Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on
Medicines-Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 23 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 2 (2015); Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate
Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213
(2015); Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment'? Eli Lilly v. Canada and
the International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1121, 1122 (2014).
For discussions of the Philip Morris cases and the related WTO complaints, see generally
LUKAS VANHONNAEKER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENTS: FROM COLLISION TO COLLABORATION 200-20 (2015); Susy Frankel &
Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1149 (2013).
129. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997)
[hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997); see October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(g)-
(h) (requiring accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties).
130. Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, June 24, 2012, http://www.wipo.
int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=12213 [https://perma.cc/R833-K576] (archived Feb. 2,
2017); see October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(i) (requiring accession to the Beijing
Treaty). The inclusion of this treaty was proposed by Australia and Japan but opposed
by South Korea.
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Organizations 1 3 1 (Rome Convention), and the Marrakesh Treaty to
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind,
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled.1
32
In addition, the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter includes
the usual provisions on technological protection measures and
electronic rights management information, 133 which are both
significantly shorter 34 and more flexible than their counterparts in
the TPP Agreement.135 Targeting online streaming and other new
means of digital communication, the draft chapter also includes
provisions addressing the unauthorized communication, or the making
available, of a copyrighted work to the public.136 The push for such
provisions is understandable, considering the recent copyright
infringement litigation concerning works disseminated through
streaming or other digital technologies.3 7
131. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; see
October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(h) (requiring accession to the Rome
Convention).
132. Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who
Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13169 [https://perma.cc/LH9Q-4LZU]
(archived Feb. 2, 2017); see October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(ibis) (requiring
accession to the Marrakesh Treaty).
133. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 2.3 (covering circumvention of
effective technological control measures); id. art. 2.3bis (covering protection for electronic
rights management information); id. art. 2.3ter (covering limitations and exceptions
concerning technological control measures and rights management information).
134. Compare id. arts. 2.3-.3ter, with TPP Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 18.68-69.
135. Nonetheless, Jeremy Malcolm suggested that these provisions may be better
than their counterparts in the TPP Agreement:
The RCEP proposals on Digital Rights Management (DRM) in Article 2.3 are a
little more flexible than the equivalent Article 18.68 of the TPP. While RCEP
still requires legal protection and remedies against the circumvention of DRM,
this only covers DRM that constrains uses of the work that are not otherwise
authorized or permitted by law.
Thus under RCEP, it would probably not be against the law to circumvent
DRM in order to view DRM-protected content on a device of your choosing, or to
copy parts of it for a fair use purpose, or for other purposes that are consistent
with copyright law. This is an important limitation of the scope of a DRM
circumvention provision.
Jeremy Malcolm, RCEP: The Other Closed-Door Agreement o Compromise Users'Rights,
ELEc. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 2016/04/rcep-
other-closed-door-agreement-compromise-users-rights [ ttps://perma.cc/ NS44-JTQ3]
(archived on Feb. 13, 2017) (hereinafter Malcolm, RCEP].
136. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 2.1.1-2 (providing authors with the
exclusive rights to authorize any communication, or making available, of copyrighted
works to the public).
137. Among the leading cases in this area are American Broadcasting Companies
v Aereo, Inc. before the U.S. Supreme Court, ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TVCatchup Ltd
before the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the "Maneki TV" case before the
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Among the negotiating parties, there was some effort-notably
from Australia-to push for stronger language on copyright limitations
and exceptions beyond the mere recitation of the three-step test in the
TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 13 Article 2.5.3 of
the leaked draft text states that "[e]ach party shall- endeavour to
provide an appropriate balance in its copyright and related rights
system by providing limitations and exceptions . . . for legitimate
purposes including education, research, criticism, comment, news
reporting, libraries and archives and facilitating access for persons
with disability." 139 The purposes listed in this provision are very
similar to those found in the preamble of the U.S. fair use provision. 140
Like the TPP intellectual property chapter, the draft RCEP
chapter includes a provision prohibiting government use of infringing
computer software.141 Unlike the TPP chapter, however, the RCEP
chapter does not extend the copyright term beyond the life of the
author plus fifty years 142--the minimum required by the Berne
Japanese Supreme Court. Am. Broad. Cos. v Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Case C-
607/11, ITV Broad. Ltd. v. TVCatchup Ltd. (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsflanguage=en&num=C-607/11 [https://perma.cc/
X8UW-DJXN] (archived Feb. 6, 2017); Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 18, 2011, 65
SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHJ [MINSHU] 121 (Japan),
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei-en/detail?id=1090 [https://perma.cc/2F3P-XLPF]
(archived on Feb. 13, 2017) ("Maneki TV" Case).
138. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 86, art. 13 ("Members shall confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder."); WCT, supra note 130, art. 10(1) ("Contracting Parties
may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights
granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special
cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.").
139. October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 2.5.3. But cf. Malcolm, RCEP, supra
note 136 (lamenting Australia's proposal as "a half-hearted positive obligation").
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106
and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." (emphasis added)).
141. Compare October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 2.4 (covering government use
of software), with TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.80 (covering government use of
software). The draft Article 2.4 was proposed by ASEAN, Australia, China, New Zealand,
and South Korea but opposed by India.
142. Compare October 15 Draft, supra note 18 (declining to include provisions
concerning the expansion of the copyright term), with TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art.
18.63 (covering the term of protection for copyright and related rights), and SOUTH
KOREA'S DRAFT, supra note 45, art. X.B. 1 (calling for an extension of the copyright term
to life of the author plus seventy years).
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Convention.143 The draft RCEP chapter also does not include detailed
TPP-like provisions on Internet service providers, secondary liability
for copyright infringement, and the notice-and-takedown
mechanism 144 (although those provisions could easily have been
negotiated as part of the yet-to-be-disclosed electronic commerce
chapter, if that chapter indeed exists).
To the disappointment of consumer advocates and civil society
organizations, South Korea proposed language requiring countries to
"take effective measures to curtail repetitive infringement of copyright
and related rights on the Internet or other digital network."1
45 In
addition, Japan called for the disclosure of information concerning the
accounts of allegedly infringing Internet subscribers. 146 It further
advanced a footnote supporting "a regime providing for limitations on
the liability of, or on the remedies available against, online service
providers while preserving the legitimate interests of [the] right
holder."1 4 7  I
Even more disturbing, the draft RCEP intellectual property
chapter offers stronger and more expansive protection to broadcasters
than the TPP intellectual property chapter, covering such issues as the
143. See Berne Convention, supra note 89, art. 7(1) ("The term of protection
granted by this Convention shall be the life of the author and fifty years after his
death.").
144. See TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.81-82 (covering Internet service
providers, legal remedies, and safe harbors).
145. October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 9quinquies.3; see also KORUS FTA,
supra note 111, art. 18.30(b)(iv)(A) (conditioning the eligibility for the limitations and
exceptions concerning Internet service providers on the providers' "adopti[on] and
reasonabl[e] implement[ation of] a policy that provides for termination in appropriate
circumstances of the accounts of repeat infringers"). The draft Article 9quinquies.3 was
proposed by South Korea but opposed by ASEAN, Australia, and Japan.
146. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 9quinquies.4 (covering the
disclosure of information concerning allegedly infringing subscribers of Internet service).
This provision was proposed by Japan but opposed by ASEAN, Australia, and South
Korea.
147. Id. art. 9quinquies.2 n.43. As the Author observed in regard to this proposed
footnote:
Japan proposes a footnote that notes that [any procedures implemented to avoid
the creation of barriers to legitimate activity] could be accomplished by means of
a safe harbor regime that limits remedies against online service providers, while
preserving legitimate interests of rights holders. However, the footnote does not
specify the details of how such a regime should operate. This is both good and
bad. It is certainly good that RCEP does not prescribe a single, inflexible model,
such as notice and takedown. However, it also fails to require countries to protect
Internet intermediaries from liability for their users' content.
Malcolm, RCEP, supra note 136.
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unauthorized retransmission of television signals over the Internet. 148
As Jeremy Malcolm commented,
[b]ased on the current text proposals, [the] RCEP may actually impose more
stringent protections for broadcasters than the TPP does. The TPP allows
authors, performers and producers to control the broadcast of their work, but it
does not bestow any independent powers over those works upon broadcasters.
[The] RCEP, in contrast, could create such new powers; potentially providing
broadcasters with a 50 year monopoly over the retransmission of broadcast
signals, including retransmission of those signals over the Internet.149
B. Trademark
In the trademark area, the draft RCEP intellectual property
chapter includes the usual language requiring accession to the Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, 150 the Singapore Treaty on the Law of
Trademarks,15 1 and the Trademark Law Treaty.152 The draft chapter
also includes provisions broadening the protectable subject matter of
trademark, thereby extending protection to sound and scent marks and
signs in three-dimensional shapes.5 3
In addition, the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter covers
the procedural improvements relating to trademark application and
148. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 2.6 (providing detailed provisions
concerning the protection of broadcasts transmitted by wire or over the air as well as
against the unauthorized retransmission of television signals on the Internet). This
provision was proposed by Australia and South Korea but opposed by ASEAN and China.
149. Malcolm, RCEP, supra note 136. As he continued:
[T]he proposed language on related rights for broadcasters is actually worse than
the TPP. The TPP negotiators were wise to mostly avoid this topic, being that it
is currently still under negotiation at WIPO, whereas RCEP has plunged ahead
and sought to enshrine obligations for the protection of broadcasters that remain
controversial and untested around the world.
Id.
150. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, June 27, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-41; see October 15 Draft,
supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(e) (requiring the accession to the Madrid Protocol).
151. Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, Mar. 27, 2006, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 110-2; see October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(d) (requiring accession to the
Singapore Treaty).
152. Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, 2037 U.N.T.S. 298; see October 15
Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(d) (requiring accession to the Trademark Law Treaty).
The adoption of this treaty was proposed by Japan and South Korea but opposed by
Australia.
153. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 3.1.2 ("No Party shall require, as a
condition of registration, that trademarks be visually perceptible, nor deny registration
of a trademark solely on the grounds that the sign of which it is composed is a sound ...
or a scent . . . ."); id. art. 3.1.3 (including "three-dimensional shapes" among "signs
capable of distinguishing the goods and services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings").
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registration, 154 including the maintenance of "a trademark
classification system that is consistent with the Nice Agreement
Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks." 15 The draft chapter,
however, does not include extensive TPP-like language on domain
names, in particular, names in country-code, top-level domains.156
Among the RCEP negotiating parties, disagreement remains over
the extent of protection for well-known trademarks, 157 including
protection through the recognition of the WIPO Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks.'5 8 The
parties also strongly disagree on ways to address the relationship
between trademarks and geographical indications, as well as the
latter's eligibility for trademark protection. 15 The current
geographical indications provisions in the draft RCEP intellectual
property chapter are significantly shorter than those in the TPP
Agreement.16 0
C. Patent
In the patent area, the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter
includes the usual FTA provisions concerning the 1991 Act of the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants 161 (UPOV), the Budapest Treaty on the International
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of
154. See id. art. 3.4 (covering procedures for trademark examination, opposition,
and cancellation); id. art. 3.5 (covering trademark registration and application); id. art.
3.5bis (allowing for the provision of information that a trademark should not be
registered).
155. Id. art. 3.3; see Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification
of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, 23
U.S.T. 1336, 550 U.N.T.S. 45.
156. See TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.28 (covering domain names,
including country-code top-level domains).
157. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 3.10 (covering the protection of well-
known trademarks).
158. See id. art. 3.10.3 ("Each Party recognises the importance of the Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks as
adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and
the General Assembly of the WIPO in 1999."). The provision was proposed by ASEAN,
India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea but opposed by Australia and China.
159. See id. art. 3.2 (covering the protection of certification and collective marks);
id. art. 3.9 (covering the protection of trademarks predating geographical indications);
id. art. 4.1 (covering the protection of geographical indications).
160. Compare id. § 4 (covering the protection of geographical indications), with
TPP Agreement, supra note 1, § E (covering the protection of geographical indications).
161. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec.
2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (amended Mar. 19, 1991); see October 15 Draft,
supra note 18, art. 1.7.60) (requiring the accession to the 1991 UPOV).
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Patent Procedure,162 the Patent Cooperation Treaty1 63 (PCT), and the
Patent Law Treaty.164 The draft chapter also includes the usual-and
usually ineffective-language6 5 concerning the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 166 and the Protocol
Amending the TRIPS Agreement. 167
Like those in the TPP Agreement,16 8 the draft patent provisions
cover both substantive rights and procedural issues, including those
concerning patent application and examination and the maintenance
of"a patent classification system that is consistent with the Strasbourg
Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification." 169
Although Japan initially called for the protection of new uses for, or
new forms of, known substances,170 directly undercutting Section 3(d)
of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005,171 the draft chapter
162. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241,
1861 U.N.T.S. 361; see October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(k) (requiring the
accession to the Budapest Treaty).
163. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231; see October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.6(b) (requiring the accession to the
Patent Cooperation Treaty).
164. Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047; see October 15 Draft, supra
note 18, art. 1.7.6(a) (requiring the accession to the Patent Law Treaty).
165. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 1.7.1-.4 (covering the TRIPS
Agreement and issues relating to public health).
166. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
167. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/641
(Dec. 8, 2005). This amendment, which created Article 31 bis of the TRIPS Agreement,
took effect on January 23, 2017. Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/ amendmente.htm (last visited Apr.
6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/BEY9-V3CMI (archived Apr. 9, 2017).
168. See TPP Agreement, supra note 1, § F(A) (covering patents).
169. October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 5.18.
170. See JAPAN'S DRAFT, supra note 44, art. XX.C.2 ("2. Each Party shall ensure
that a claimed invention is not excluded from the patentable subject matter solely on the
ground that the invention is a new form of a known substance which does not result in
the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or that the invention is a new
use for a known substance.").
171. Section 3(d) specifically prevents patent protection from being granted to
the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in
increased efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or
new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine
or apparatus unless such process results in a new product or employs at least
one new reactant.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 3(d), INDIA CODE (2005); see also Amy
Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation
in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1590-98 (2009) (discussing
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005).
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does not offer such protection. 172 Nevertheless, there remains
continued disagreement between the RCEP negotiating parties over
the appropriate standards concerning worldwide novelty for
patents,17 3 patent term restoration (or extension) as compensation for
the time lost due to unreasonable regulatory delay,174 patents for new
plant varieties, 175 and the handling of patent-related information
disclosed during the one-year grace period.176
D. Trade Secret
In the area of trade secrets and other undisclosed information, the
relevant provisions are included in both the patent and unfair
competition sections of the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter.
The patent section includes a TRIPS-plus provision requiring the
introduction of a data exclusivity regime, which prevents the reliance
on clinical trial data submitted for the marketing approval of
pharmaceuticals. 177 However, no provision focuses specifically on
172. Compare JAPAN'S DRAFT, supra note 44, art. XX.C.2, with October 15 Draft,
supra note 18, § 5.
173. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 5.12 (covering worldwide novelty
for patents). The provision was proposed by Japan and New Zealand but opposed by
ASEAN and India. As the draft provision reads, with the usual bracketed texts:
Each Party shall ensure that a claimed invention shall not be new, if it is [NZ
propose: made available to the public by written or oral description or in any
other way] [NZ oppose: [CN propose: known to the public] [CN oppose: publicly
known], [CN oppose: described in a publication distributed or made available to
the public through [JP propose: the Internet] in any Party or in any non-Party
before the filing date of the application for a patent, where priority is claimed,
before the priority date of the application.
Id.
174. See id. art. 5.13 (covering patent term restoration). The provision was
proposed by Japan and South Korea but opposed by ASEAN, Australia, China, India,
and New Zealand.
175. See id. art. 5.19 ("Each Party shall provide for the protection of all plant
genera and species by an effective plant varieties protection system which is consistent
with the 1991 UPOV Convention."). The provision was proposed by Australia, Japan,
and South Korea but opposed by ASEAN, China, India, and New Zealand.
176. See id. art. 5.14 (allowing for the provision of information concerning the
denial of novelty or inventive step). The provision was proposed by China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, and South Korea but opposed by ASEAN.
177. Proposed by Japan and South Korea and opposed by ASEAN, Australia,
China, India, and New Zealand, the draft provision reads:
Each Party shall prevent applicants for marketing approval for pharmaceutical
products which utilize new chemical entities from relying on or from referring to
test or other data submitted to its competent authority by the first applicant for
a certain period of time counted from the date of approval of that application. As
of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, such period of time is stipulated
as being no less than five years by the relevant laws of each Party.
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biologic medicines, a highly contentious and controversial topic during
the TPP negotiations.178
Compared with those in the patents section, the provisions in the
unfair competition section do not seem to go significantly beyond the
requirements of Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement."9 Nevertheless,
some civil society organizations have considered the RCEP negotiators'
"failure to explicitly address the need for exceptions to trade secret
protection for whistleblowers, journalists, and other disclosures in the
public interest . . . [a] missed opportunity."8 0
E. Intellectual Property Enforcement
With respect to intellectual property enforcement, the draft RCEP
intellectual property chapter includes the usual provisions concerning
civil, criminal, and administrative procedures and remedies, as well as
provisional and border measures.18 1 Although a considerable portion
of the draft language in the enforcement section merely reaffirms the
existing rights and obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, the
proposed language increases the obligations concerning the seizure
and destruction of allegedly infringing goods, including the grant of
authority to take ex officio action 182 and to seize or destroy the
materials or implements used to create infringing goods.83 The draft
Id. art. 5.16.
178. See TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.51 (covering biologics); see also
Burcu Kilic & Courtney Pine, Decision Time on Biologics Exclusivity: Eight Years Is No
Compromise, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 27, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/07/
27/decision-time-on-biologics-exclusivity-eight-years-is-no-compromise/ [https://perma.cc/
3Y2F-273E] (archived Feb. 13, 2017) (discussing the controversy surrounding the
protection of biologics during the TPP negotiations).
179. Compare October 15 Draft, supra note 18, § 8 (providing the section on unfair
competition), with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 86, art. 39 (covering the protection of
trade secrets and undisclosed information).
180. Malcolm, RCEP, supra note 136.
181. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, § 9 (providing the section on intellectual
property enforcement).
182. See id. art. 9ter.5 (covering the suspension of infringing goods by ex-officio
action). The provision was proposed by Australia, Japan, and South Korea but opposed
by ASEAN.
183. See id. art. 9bis.5 (providing "the authority to order the seizure of allegedly
infringing goods, materials, and implements relevant to the act of infringement, and, at
least for trademark counterfeiting, documentary evidence relevant to the infringement");
id. art. 9bis.6 (covering the destruction of infringing goods, materials, and implements);
id. 9bis.10 (covering provisional measures); id. art. 9quater.6 (covering the forfeiture or
destruction of all infringing goods, materials, and implements used to create infringing
goods); see also Malcolm, RCEP, supra note 136 ('Articles 9bis.6 and 9quater.6 of RCEP
would allow courts to order the destruction not only of infringing goods, but also
materials and implements used in their creation, such as servers used for hosting
copyright-infringing files."). These provisions were proposed by Australia, South Korea,
and Japan (except for art. 9bis.5) but opposed by ASEAN.
714 [VOL. 50:673
20171 THE RCEP AND TRANS-PACIFIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NORMS 715
chapter also seeks to empower judicial authorities to determine
damages for intellectual property infringement based on lost profits,
the market price, or the suggested retail price.184
Like the TPP intellectual property chapter, the draft RCEP
chapter calls for criminal procedures and penalties for unauthorized
camcording in cinemas.185 Unlike the TPP, however, the draft RCEP
provisions on criminal procedures and penalties are not extensive.
They apply to neither trade secret infringement 186 nor the
circumvention of technological protection measures. 187 The draft
provisions on border measures are also less detailed and less
invasive.188
At the time of writing, the RCEP negotiating parties still strongly
disagree on the appropriate standards concerning criminal liability for
184. Proposed by Australia, Japan, and South Korea but opposed by ASEAN and
India, the draft damages provision reads as follows:
[AU/KR propose : at least in the case of copyrights or related rights infringements
and trademark counterfeiting,] the profits of the infringer that are attributable
to the infringement which may be presumed to be the amount of damages
referred to in clause (i). In determining [JP/AU propose: the amount of] damages
[KR/AU propose: for infringement of intellectual property rights] [JP/AU/KR
propose: referred to in the paragraph above], [JP/AU propose: a Party's] judicial
authorities shall have the authority to consider, inter alia, [JP/KR propose: any
legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, [KR/AU oppose: which may
include lost profits,]] the value of the infringed [JP/KR/AU propose: goods or
services], measured by the market price, [JP/AU/KR propose: or] the suggested
retail price.]
October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 9bis.2(i).
185. The draft provision reads:
Each Party shall provide for criminal procedures to be applied against any
person who, without authorization of the holder of copyright or related rights in
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, knowingly uses or attempts to use
an audiovisual recording device to transmit or make a copy of the motion picture
or other audiovisual work, or any part thereof, from a performance of the motion
picture or other audiovisual work in a public motion picture exhibition facility.
Id. art. 9quinquies.5; see also TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.77.4 ("Recognising
the need to address the unauthorised copying of a cinematographic work from a
performance in a movie theatre that causes significant harm to a right holder in the
market for that work, and recognising the need to deter such harm, each Party shall
adopt or maintain measures, which shall at a minimum include, but need not be limited
to, appropriate criminal procedures and penalties."). The draft Article 9quinquies.5 was
proposed by South Korea but opposed by ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand.
186. See TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.78.1 (calling for the provision of
criminal procedures and penalties in regard to certain trade secret infringements).
187. See id. art. 18.61.1 ("Each Party shall provide for criminal procedures and
penalties to be applied if any person is found to have engaged wilfully and for the
purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain in any of the . . . activities [relating
to the circumvention of technological protection measures].").
188. See October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 9ter (covering border measures).
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aiding and abetting,'8 9 the award of attorneys' fees,190 and obligations
relating to intellectual property enforcement in the digital
environment. 191 Facing strong opposition from its negotiating
partners, South Korea remains the lone party calling for the provision
of pre-established damages.'9 2
F. Summary
When all of these five sections are taken together, much of the
language in the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter resembles
the language found in either the TRIPS Agreement or the TPP
Agreement. Nevertheless, the draft RCEP chapter includes provisions
that are different from those in these earlier agreements. For example,
it includes a section on genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and
folklore, which is more lengthy and detailed than the one found in the
TPP Agreement.'9 3 The language in that section can be traced back to
India's ten-paragraph original proposal. 194 Despite opposition from
Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, China also
proposed language on the disclosure of origin or source of genetic
resources. 195 The proposed language resembles Article 26 of the
189. See id. art. 9quater.4 (calling for the provision of "criminal liability for aiding
and abetting"). The provision was proposed by Japan but opposed by ASEAN, Australia,
China, and South Korea.
190. Proposed by Australia and South Korea but opposed by ASEAN, the draft
provision reads:
Each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities, [JP oppose: except in
exceptional circumstances] [JP propose: where appropriate,] shall have the
authority to order, at the conclusion of civil judicial proceedings concerning
copyright or related rights infringement, [AU oppose: patent infringement,] or
trademark infringement, that the prevailing party shall be awarded payment by
the losing party of court costs or fees and reasonable attorneys' fees.
Id. art. 9bis.4.
191. See id. art. 9quinquies (covering intellectual property enforcement in the
digital environment).
192. Proposed by South Korea but opposed by ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan,
and New Zealand, the draft provision reads:
In civil judicial proceedings, each Party shall, at least with respect to works,
phonograms, and performances protected by copyright or related rights, and in
case of trademark counterfeiting, establish or maintain pre-established
damages, which shall be available on the election of the right holder. Pre-
established damages shall be in an amount sufficient to constitute a deterrent to
future infringements and to compensate fully the right holder for the harm
caused by the infringement.
Id. art. 9bis.3.
193. See id. § 7 (covering genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore).
194. INDIA'S DRAFT, supra note 43, art. 14.
195. The specific draft language provides:
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Chinese Patent Law, which requires patent applicants to disclose the
traditional knowledge and genetic resources used in their
inventions.196
In addition, the RCEP negotiators debated whether Draft Section
12 should be about transitional periods and arrangements or about
special and differential treatment.19 7 The recognition of the need for
special and differential treatment is one of the key distinctions
between the RCEP and the TPP. 198 Principle 4 of the Guiding
Principles specifically declared that "[t]aking into consideration the
different levels of development of the participating countries, the
RCEP will include appropriate forms of flexibility including provision
for special and differential treatment, plus additional flexibility to the
least-developed ASEAN Member States, consistent with the existing
ASEAN+1 FTAs, as applicable."1 99 The provision of such flexibility is
[ASN/CN propose; AU/IN/JP/KR oppose; 1. Subject to each Party's rights and
obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other
international agreements related to GRTKF [genetic resources, traditional
knowledge, and folklore], each Party may establish appropriate measures to
protect GRTKF and prevent misappropriation and misuse of GRTK. The Parties
also recognise the importance of providing disclosure of origin or sources of
GRTK used in relevant [intellectual property] applications.]
[CN propose; AU/IN/JP/KR/NZ oppose: 2. In terms of genetic resources, on
which the development of the inventions claimed in patent applications relies,
the Parties shall ask the applicants to disclose the detailed information about
the origin.
The Parties shall take appropriate, effective and proportionate measures that
aim to practically curb any violations to the obligations under Paragraph 1 of the
Article. Failure to fulfill the disclosure obligations under Paragraph 1 will result
in pending of corresponding patent applications and refusal to grant of patent
rights.]
October 15 Draft, supra note 18, art. 7.1.
196. See Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective
Oct. 1, 2009), art. 26 (China), translated in http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/
201101/t20110119_566244.html [https://perma.cc/A7X4-HREZ] (archived on Feb. 13,
2017) [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law] ("With regard to an invention-creation
accomplished by relying on genetic resources, the applicant shall, in the patent
application documents, indicate the direct and original source of the genetic resources.
If the applicant cannot indicate the original source, he shall state the reasons.").
197. The debated heading of Section 12 reads:
[AU oppose : SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT] [AU propose:
ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITIES FOR LDC], TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
October 15 Draft, supra note 18, § 12.
198. See Urata, A Stages Approach, supra note 113, at 127 ("One of the main
differences between the TPP and the RCEP is the treatment of least-developed
countries.").
199. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, Principle 4.
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especially attractive to the developing-country members of ASEAN+6,
which have consistently benefited from such treatment. Cases in point
are the early harvest programs in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area,
which provided for the early opening of markets for select goods and
services.200
Special and differential treatment is also necessitated by the
existence of least developed countries in the RCEP 201 -namely,
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, the three newest ASEAN members. 202
Thanks to a June 2013 TRIPS Council decision, the TRIPS transition
period for these countries has now been extended to July 1, 2021.203
The TPP, by contrast, does not include any least developed countries
(even though its intellectual property chapter does offer transition
200. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 72, at 996-97 (discussing the
early harvest programs in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area). As one commentator
observes:
The modality on tariff reduction and elimination, including the EHP [Early
Harvest Program] especially, is thus far undoubtedly the jewel in the crown of
the [ASEAN-China Free Trade Area]. The EHP has given ASEAN exporters
significant advantage over other WTO members in the trade of agricultural
goods with China. In the first half year after the EHP was implemented, ASEAN
exports of fruits and vegetables increased by 30 per cent. According to the
statistics released by the government of Malaysia, Malaysia's exports to China
under the EHP reached RM514 million 'and RM540 million in 2004 and 2005
respectively. During the same period, it imported only RM14 million from China.
Wang Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China Free Trade Agreement, in
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, supra note 80, at 192,
198 (footnote omitted); see also Gao, RTA Strategy, supra note 82, at 63 ("Even though
many commentators have doubted the economic benefit to China from an ASEAN-China
FTA, as the two are competitors on many products, China has adopted the guideline of
'give a lot while demand little' in FTA negotiations because the political significance of
such an FTA greatly outweighs economic considerations.") (footnote omitted).
201. See Urata, A Stages Approach, supra note 113, at 127 (discussing the RCEP
negotiating parties' willingness to provide special and differential treatment to least
developed countries); see also Barry Desker, ASEAN Integration Remains an Illusion, E.
ASIA F. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/02/asean-integration-
remains-an-illusion/ [https://perma.cclLZ4G-JE3M] (archived on Feb, 13, 2017) ("There
is a real worry that a 'two-stage' ASEAN is emerging. The six earlier members plus
Vietnam are leading the way while Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos remain mired in their
least-developed country status.").
202. See UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY, LIST OF LEAST
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc list.
pdf (May 2016) [https://perma.cc/SCA3-QNX5] (archived on Feb. 13, 2017) (listing what
the United Nations deems least developed countries as of May 2016). Vietnam is also
one of ASEAN's newest members, but its economic and technological conditions have
considerably improved since it joined the association.
203. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Extension of
the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members: Decision
of the Council for TRIPS of 11 June 2013, 1 1, WTO Doc. IP/C/64 (June 11, 2013) ("Least
developed country Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of the [TRIPS]
Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, until 1 July 2021, or until such a date on
which they cease to be a least developed country Member, whichever date is earlier.").
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periods to six of the twelve TPP partners-namely, Brunei
Darussalam, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, and Vietnam).204
In sum, the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter, like any
other treaty in the middle of negotiations, includes a wide variety of
bracketed texts. While some of the draft provisions are stronger than,
or similar to, what is found in the TPP Agreement, other language is
much weaker. The draft text also includes language that cannot be
found in the TPP Agreement or other TRIPS-plus FTAs.205 Given that
"nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"206-a favorite aphorism
of treaty negotiators and other government officials-it remains to be
seen what the final RCEP intellectual property chapter will look like,
or even whether the final agreement will include an intellectual
property chapter.
Despite this uncertainty, this Article aims to provide some
indication of the directions of the ongoing RCEP negotiations. At the
end of these negotiations, it is possible that much of the bracketed
language in the draft intellectual property chapter will be retained or
only slightly altered. If so, the finalized chapter will indeed require the
poorer ASEAN+6 members to offer higher levels of intellectual
property protection and enforcement than what the TRIPS Agreement
currently requires. It is therefore understandable why the draft RCEP
intellectual property chapter has become a major concern among
policymakers, commentators, activists, consumer advocates, and civil
society organizations, especially in regard to the chapter's potential
deleterious impact on access to essential medicines and digital
communication. 207
204. See TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.83.4 (providing transition periods
to Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, and Vietnam).
205. See .Malcolm, RCEP, supra note 136 (noting that although the RCEP
"manage[s] to avoid some of the worst excesses of the TPP . . ., the proposed language
on related rights for broadcasters is actually worse than the TPP").
206. Henrique C. Moraes, Dealing with Forum Shopping: Some Lessons from the
Negotiation on SECURE at the World Customs Organization, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 159, 176 (Li Xuan & Carlos
Correa eds., 2009).
207. See 2015 Oct 15 Version, supra note 41 ("Japan and Korea are pushing for
test data monopolies, without the same safeguards available to patent monopolies. There
are proposals for patent extensions, restrictive rules on exceptions to copyright, and
dozens of other anti-consumer measures, illustrating the power of right-holder groups to
use secret trade negotiations to limit democratic decisions that impact access to
knowledge, the freedom to innovate and the right to health, in negative ways."); Malcolm,
RCEP, supra note 136 (highlighting the problems and flaws of the leaked RCEP
intellectual property chapter); Press Release, M6decins Sans Frontibres Access
Campaign, New Threat Against Affordable Medicines in Trade Negotiations with India
and ASEAN (Apr. 21, 2016), http://msfaccess.org/about-us/media-room/press-releases/
new-threat-against-affordable-medicines-trade-negotiations-india [https:I/perma.cc/2WKX-
WNKP] (archived Feb. 13, 2017) (warning that "[a]ccess to affordable medicines could be
severely restricted for millions of people around the world under the current proposals
in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership").
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V. FINAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHAPTER
Although nobody at this point can predict how the RCEP
negotiations will play out-or whether the RCEP Agreement, if
completed, will ever be ratified-it is actually not that difficult to
determine whether the agreement will contain an intellectual property
chapter. There seem to be three plausible outcomes: First, there will be
no intellectual property chapter. Second, there will be an intellectual
property chapter that is similar to the one now included in the TPP
Agreement. Third, there will be an intellectual property chapter, but
that chapter will contain much weaker standards than those found in
the TPP. This Part discusses and assesses each outcome in turn.
A. No Chapter
The first outcome is plausible because the wide disagreement
among ASEAN+6 members could eventually cause them to abandon
efforts to include an intellectual property chapter in the RCEP
Agreement. Within the Asia-Pacific region, developments in the
intellectual property area have been dynamic, distinct, diverse, highly
uneven, and rapidly changing.208
For instance, some ASEAN+6 members are far behind others in
protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights. As a result, they
continue to struggle with massive piracy and counterfeiting
problems. 209 Such problems not only have slowed down the
development of their domestic intellectual property industries, but
they have also created considerable demands on enforcement
resources-resources that these countries either do not have or are
reluctant to provide at the expense of other equally, or more, pressing
public needs.210
208. See supra note 124.
209. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2016 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 3 (2014)
(listing China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand on the Priority Watch List). For the
Author's earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st
ed. 2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:
Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV.
131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in Post- WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates
to Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, Three Questions That Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China
Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 412 (2008).
210. As the Author noted in an earlier article:
Given the limited resources in many less developed countries, an increase in
resources in the enforcement area inevitably will lead to the withdrawal of
resources from other competing, and at times more important, public needs.
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Many other ASEAN+6 members have also struggled with
problems concerning access to essential medicines, educational
materials, computer software, information technology, scientific and
technical knowledge, and patented seeds and foodstuffs. Because
higher standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement
would limit access to these much-needed materials,21 1 these countries
simply do not see higher intellectual property standards as in their
best interest. In their view, whatever benefits those standards provide
will be far outweighed by the costs of stronger intellectual property
protection and enforcement and by the adverse impact in areas not
driven by intellectual property industries. 212 After all, many
ASEAN+6 economies still rely heavily on agriculture and industrial
production.213
To further complicate matters, the very strong preference of
ASEAN-and, to a lesser extent, ASEAN+6 members-to achieve
solutions based on the ASEAN Way 214 has made it particularly
difficult for the more powerful ASEAN+6 members, such as Japan or
South Korea, to shove their high intellectual property standards down
the throats of their less powerful neighbors. Thus, if the RCEP is to be
negotiated in the ASEAN Way, it is unclear whether the RCEP
These public needs include, among others, purification of water, generation of
power, improvement of public health, reduction of child mortality, provision of
education, promotion of public security, building of basic infrastructure,
reduction of violent crimes, relief of poverty, elimination of hunger, promotion of
gender equality, protection of the environment and response to terrorism, illegal
arms sales, human and drug trafficking, illegal immigration and corruption.
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 3-4 (2010)
[hereinafter Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates].
211. For discussions of issues explored in the access to knowledge debate, see
generally ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Gaelle
Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010); SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE (2016); Amy Kapczynski, The Access to
Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804
(2008).
212. See, e.g., EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PATENT SYSTEM 93-109 (1951) (discussing the costs and gains involved in the
participation of the international patent system); A. Samuel Oddi, The International
Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831,
840-41 (1987) (listing the costs of the international patent system as established through
the Paris Convention); Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, supra note 211, at
3-4 (noting the direct and indirect costs of intellectual property enforcement).
213. See Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?view=chart (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
9USS-UGRE] (archived on Feb. 13, 2017) (providing data on the added value of industry
and agriculture as a percentage of GDP).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
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participating members will eventually reach a consensus on an
intellectual property chapter.215
Despite all of these considerations, there are at least three reasons
why the RCEP Agreement will most likely contain an intellectual
property chapter in the end. First, when ASEAN+6 members adopted
the Guiding Principles in August 2012, they agreed to include an
intellectual property text in the RCEP Agreement. 216 After its
establishment at the third round of the RCEP negotiations in January
2014,217 the working group on intellectual property has also worked
actively to develop the draft text of the intellectual property chapter.
Absent any catastrophic developments in the RCEP negotiations, the
investment in this working group is just too substantial for the chapter
to be abandoned at this late stage.
Second, given the importance of intellectual property industries to
countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, it
is very unlikely that these countries will be content with a regional
trade and investment agreement hat does not contain an intellectual
property chapter. If these countries threaten to pull out of the RCEP
negotiations, the key question for the remaining ASEAN+6 members
will no longer be about whether the agreement should include an
intellectual property chapter, but whether such inclusion is so
important to them that they would rather lose the entire regional pact
or the participation of key neighbors in this pact than omit the chapter.
Third, apart from these developed-country members, China,
India, and other emerging countries within ASEAN+6-or what the
Author has called "middle intellectual property powers" 218 -have
begun to appreciate the strategic benefits of stronger intellectual
property protection and enforcement. Although these countries have
yet to embrace the very high protection and enforcement standards
found in the European Union, Japan, or the United States, they now
welcome standards that are higher than what is currently available in
the Asia-Pacific region. These countries are therefore unlikely to block
the inclusion of an intellectual property chapter in the RCEP
Agreement.
215. Cf. Gantz, supra note 11, at 64 ("ASEAN ... has had a very poor track record
over 20 years in reducing intra-regional tariff and non-tariff barriers and adopting
effective government to government dispute settlement mechanisms, also suggests the
level of difficulties facing the negotiators.").
216. See Guiding Principles, supra note 48, § V ("The text on intellectual property
in the RCEP will aim to reduce [intellectual property]-related barriers to trade and
investment by promoting economic integration and cooperation in the utilization,
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.").
217. See RCEP News, supra note 39 (summarizing the outcome of the third round
of the RCEP negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in January 2014).
218. Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84
(Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014).
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B. TPP-Like Chapter
In the second outcome, the RCEP Agreement will include an
intellectual property chapter containing high protection and
enforcement standards, similar to those found in the TPP Agreement.
A key rationale behind such inclusion is that, if the RCEP is to
successfully compete with the TPP as a viable alternative for setting
trade norms in the Asia-Pacific region-at least before the United
States' withdrawal-it will need to provide effective standards in the
intellectual property area. Otherwise, it will lose the support of those
economies that are driven heavily by intellectual property and
technology industries-both within ASEAN+6 and outside.
If the TPP is indeed dead, as some policymakers and
commentators have suggested,2 19 the RCEP will still need to provide
standards that are high enough to entice existing TPP partners to
embrace the partnership as a dominant forum for setting regional
intellectual property norms. Without such participation, a new
regional pact could easily emerge to take the TPP's place. Such
emergence will accelerate should the Trump administration change its
mind or be satisfied with the new arrangement.
More importantly, the RCEP intellectual property chapter may
have already garnered the support of not only the developed-country
members of ASEAN+6 but also its developing-country members. It is
no surprise that Japan advanced at the RCEP negotiations a very
detailed proposal for an intellectual property chapter.220 After all, the
country has the strongest and most sophisticated economy in Asia,
with a GDP per capita of $32,477.22 in 2015, as estimated by the World
Bank.221 It also has a well-functioning intellectual property system.
According to WIPO statistics, Japan currently ranks second in terms
of international patent applications filed through the PCT, behind only
the United States.222
219. See Kaori Kaneko & Yoshifumi Takemoto, Japan Ratifies TPP Trade Pact to
Fly the Flag for Free Trade, REUTERS (Dec 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-
japan-tpp-idUSKBN13YOCU ('Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has said the TPP
would be 'meaningless without the United States'."); see also Joshua Berlinger, TPP
Unravels: Where the 11 Other Countries Go from Here, CNN (Jan. 24, 2017, 9:59 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/asia/tpp-other-11-countries-what-next/ (registering the
reactions of the leaders of other TPP partners after the United States' withdrawal).
220. See JAPAN'S DRAFT, supra note 44.
221. GDP Per Capita (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cclWT82-PKT4]
(archived Feb. 13, 2017).
222. Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2016?, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic-
pct2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P5E-6JB5] (archived on Apr. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Who
Filed Most PCT Applications].
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In addition, Japan originated the proposal to establish ACTA.
Conceived as a "Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Counterfeits and
Pirated Goods," that proposal for an anti-counterfeiting treaty was
advanced by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the June 2005 G-8
meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland.22 3 As a TPP member, Japan also has
a strong interest in ensuring that the intellectual property standards
in the RCEP Agreement are comparable to those found in the TPP
Agreement. From a business standpoint, i  would be a major nightmare
for Japanese firms to juggle two very different sets of standards within
the Asia-Pacific region.
Like Japan, South Korea's economy is highly developed, with a
GDP per capita of $27,221.53 in 2015, as estimated by the World
Bank.224 The country also has a well-functioning intellectual property
system and a highly successful home electronics industry, with
Samsung and LG being household names. Since May 2007, the Korean
Intellectual Property Office has actively engaged the European Patent
Office, the Japan Patent Office, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, and the State Intellectual Property Office of China
to identify ways to streamline and harmonize their patent examination
systems.22 5 According to WIPO, South Korea currently has the world's
fifth largest volume of PCT applications, behind the United States,
Japan, China, and Germany.226 Among corporate applicants, LG and
Samsung rank fifth and ninth in the world, respectively.227
Moreover, the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which
entered into force in March 2012, requires South Korea to adopt some
of the world's highest intellectual property standards.228 To the extent
that these standards have increased the costs of its goods and services
and thereby undercut its global competitiveness, South Korea will have
a strong incentive to level the playing field by introducing similar cost-
raising standards to other ASEAN+6 members through the RCEP. As
Jeremy Malcolm lamented,
[fjar from setting up a positive alternative to the TPP, South Korea is channeling
the [U.S. Trade Representative] at its worst here-what on earth are they
223. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 91, at 980-83 (discussing Japan's
proposal for an anti-counterfeiting treaty, which eventually became ACTA).
224. GDP Per Capita (Current US$), supra note 222.
225. See PETER DRAHos, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT
OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 236 (2010) (noting that the European Patent Office, the
Japan Patent Office, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the State Intellectual
Property Office of China, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office have met
frequently since 2007 to discuss ways to "improve the efficiency of their examination
systems and to harmonize their office systems").
226. Who Filed Most PCT Applications, supra note 222.
227. Id.
228. See KORUS FTA, supra note 111, arts. 18.1-12 (providing high standards
of intellectual property protection and enforcement).
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thinking? The answer may be that, having been pushed into accepting
unfavorably strict copyright, patent, and trademark rules in the process of
negotiating its 2012 free trade agreement with the United States, Korea
considers that it would be at a disadvantage if other countries were not subject
to the same restrictions.229
Together with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand-the three
other ASEAN+6 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)-South Korea will be able to form
a Developed-Country Quad within ASEAN+6. As far as the RCEP is
concerned, this group of countries will be powerful enough to push
actively for high standards of intellectual property protection and
enforcement. Given the similarities between these standards and those
found in the TPP Agreement, the four ASEAN members that are also
TPP partners-Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Vietnam-may also choose to support the inclusion of TPP-like
standards in the RCEP.
The most interesting developments leading up to this second
outcome concerns the large developing-country members of ASEAN+6,
such as China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. As
noted earlier, China, India, and other emerging countries in the Asia-
Pacific region have begun to appreciate the strategic benefits of
stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement.
A case in point is China. Once a technologically backward country
that relied heavily on piracy and counterfeiting to catch up, China now
ranks third in terms of PCT applications, behind only the United
States and Japan.230 Among corporate applicants, ZTE Corporation
and Huawei Technologies also rank the first and second in the world,
respectively.231 As regards trademark protection, China currently has
the world's fourth largest volume of international trademark
applications filed under the Madrid system.23 2
To be certain, China, India, and other emerging countries in the
region may still find the intellectual property' standards proposed by
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea higher than what
they would prefer. Nevertheless, they may not find those standards
highly objectionable,233 especially if they manage to secure greater
229. Malcolm, Meet RCEP, supra note 110.
230. Who Filed Most PCT Applications, supra note 222.
231. Id.
232. Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2016?, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstatslen/
docs/infographic madrid 2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8ZK-595T] (archived on Apr. 9, 2017).
233. See Peter Drahos, Will the TPP Transform Intellectual Property Regulation
in Asia?, E. ASIA F. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/17/will-the-
tpp-transform-intellectual-property-regulation-in-asial [https://perma.cc/R5LF-C9K4]
(archived on Feb. 13, 2017) ("China might even see some longer-term advantages in
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concessions in other trade or trade-related areas. After all, these
emerging countries are now growing rapidly in both economic and
technological terms. Their intellectual property standards have
therefore been slowly elevated to match their changing local
conditions. It will be only a matter of time before these standards catch
up with those found in their more developed neighbors.
Some leaders in these emerging countries may also welcome new
RCEP requirements for stronger intellectual property protection and
enforcement. After all, those requirements will provide these leaders
with the much-needed external push to accelerate domestic intellectual
property reforms.234 In China, for example, the standards required by
the TRIPS Agreement and the push for accession to the WTO led to a
complete overhaul of its copyright, patent, and trademark laws in the
early 2000s.23 5 To many reformist leaders, having their hands tied by
international treaties can sometimes be used as an effective weapon
against hardline leaders and conservative critics at home.236
embracing some intellectual property standards, including patent standards, given
China's dominance in the manufacture of active pharmaceutical ingredients.").
234. As the Author noted in regard to intellectual property law reforms in China:
[B]ecause reformist leaders were constantly challenged by their more
conservative counterparts, who were uncomfortable with the country's rapid
socio-economic changes and the social ills brought about by these changes, the
rhetoric allowed the reformist leaders to deflate criticisms of their kowtowing to
foreign interests, especially in times of considerable external pressure from the
United States. Instead, the leaders could highlight the economic benefits of
stronger intellectual property protection and justify intellectual property
reforms as an important leapfrogging tool to enable China to catchup with its
more advanced trading partners. The reformist leadership could also tie the
reforms to the growing nationalist sentiments that longed for China's regaining
its rightful place following centuries of humiliation and semi-colonial rule.
Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 210, at 192.
235. See Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation ofIntellectual Property
Laws in China, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND
EUROPE 20, 26 (Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Yu, Transplant and Transformation]
(discussing the effort China took to undertake a major overhaul of its intellectual
property laws in the run-up to the WTO accession); see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners
II, supra note 210, at 906-23 (examining the various amendments to the Chinese
intellectual property system at the turn of the new millennium).
236. See MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE TAIL:
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 41 (1999) ("An international institution
such as the WTO can help bolster China's reform leadership against powerful hard-
liners. International institutions can tie the hands of leaders in ways that the ineffectual
bilateral relationship is not able to do so."); Michael E. DeGolyer, Western Exposure,
China Orientation: The Effects of Foreign Ties and Experience on Hong Kong, in THE
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1997-1998 SUMMITS: CHINESE
AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE 299, 300
(Peter Koehn & Joseph Y.S. Cheng eds., 1999) ("[Economic integration] would help the
reformers tilt the internal Chinese debate in directions that would minimize, if not avoid,
future economic conflicts. It would encourage and perhaps accelerate the inevitable
transformation of China's political regime.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Peter
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To be certain, the weaker and poorer ASEAN+6 members may still
be reluctant to accept an intellectual property chapter with high
protection and enforcement standards. Nevertheless, the benefits they
will secure from the RCEP in other trade or trade-related areas may
more than compensate for their losses in the intellectual property area.
To a large extent, the trade-offs in the RCEP may not be that different
from the trade-offs they have experienced in the WTO.
From a Realist standpoint, many of these poorer and weaker
countries also have very limited power or recourse if their more
powerful neighbors insist on including an intellectual property chapter
with high protection and enforcement standards. For the former, it is
just not a viable option to lose the new trade and trade-related benefits
provided by Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South
Korea, and other more powerful neighbors through the RCEP.
Although it is entirely possible that the RCEP Agreement will
include a TPP-like intellectual property chapter, it is still unlikely that
the agreement will do so considering that the FTAs China and India
have thus far entered into do not include similarly high protection and
enforcement standards.2 37
If the RCEP Agreement included TPP-like standards, these
powerful developing countries would have to completely overhaul their
intellectual property systems-an outcome they have fought very hard
at the WTO and WIPO to avoid.23 8 Given the pivotal roles China and
India have played in the RCEP negotiations, it is just difficult to
imagine that these countries would suddenly welcome requirements
they had adamantly opposed in major international fora.239 It is also
K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1107 (2011) [hereinafter
Yu, TRIPS Enforcement Dispute] ("In China, the reformists are constantly challenged by
their more conservative counterparts, who are uncomfortable with the country's rapid
socio-economic changes and the resulting social ills. By providing the much-needed
external push that helps reduce resistance from conservative leaders, the panel report
[in China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights] has helped accelerate reforms in the area of intellectual property protection and
enforcement.") (footnote omitted).
237. For discussions of China's FTAs, see generally Gao, RTA Strategy, supra note
82, at 53; Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure: Cross-Regionalism and the China-Iceland
Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362 (2010); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements,
supra note 72.
238. See Minutes of Meeting from TRIPS Council, 11 248-73, WTO Doc.
IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010) (reporting the criticisms by China and India of the TRIPS-plus
enforcement standards established by ACTA and other bilateral and regional trade
agreements); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles'Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 518-
20 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel] (discussing the interventions
China and India made at the TRIPS Council's June 2010 meeting addressing the release
of the draft ACTA text and the growing push for TRIPS-plus intellectual property
enforcement standards via bilateral and regional trade agreements).
239. See Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 239, at 514-21 (noting the
developing countries' resistance to high intellectual property enforcement standards).
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very unlikely that Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea
could force these powerful emerging countries to accept the heightened
requirements on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Nevertheless, if these developed countries managed to convince
China and India to support the inclusion of an intellectual property
chapter with high TPP-like intellectual property standards, or if China
and India changed their minds (due perhaps to changing economic and
technological conditions), the RCEP intellectual property chapter
would facilitate greater harmonization of protection and enforcement
standards at both the regional and global levels. Within the Asia-
Pacific region, these new standards would help pave the way for the
establishment of the FTAAP. Other countries in the region would
warmly welcome such harmonization, considering that many of them
remain reluctant to support-and, for some, even unable to afford-
two expansive yet differing regional trade pacts.240
Across the world, the new RCEP standards would help accelerate
international harmonization of intellectual property standards at both
the WTO and WIPO. As the TRIPS negotiations have demonstrated,
multilateral standards tend to be developed by first securing a
consensus among the key negotiating parties before slowly extending
those standards to other members of the international community.241
The harmonization facilitated by the RCEP would therefore be highly
important, especially in view of the current deadlock between
developed and developing countries in the Doha Round.
240. See Lewis, Achieving a FTAAP, supra note 23, at 231 ("The most likely
alternatives to the TPP . . . are either ASEAN+6 or ASEAN+3, or perhaps a new model
with a China-Japan-Korea FTA at its core."); see also id. at 223 (examining the prospects
for the TPP to expand into a FTAAP); Jane Kelsey, Jane Kelsey, Introduction to No
ORDINARY DEAL, supra note 36, at 10, 17-18 ("[Tlhe [TPP Agreement] was envisaged as
the foundation for an APEC-wide free trade agreement.").
241. See supra text accompanying notes 86-92.
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C. TPP-Lite Chapter
In the final outcome, China and India will push for an intellectual
property chapter that contains much lower standards than those
initially proposed by Japan and South Korea and now supported by
other developed-country members of ASEAN+6. While these proposals
may have provided useful starting points for the working group on
intellectual property, the remaining RCEP negotiating parties-led by
China and India, perhaps-have actively bargained down the terms of
the draft intellectual property chapter. In the end, this chapter will
contain terms that offer more limited protection than the TPP
intellectual property chapter, but still more expansive protection than
the TRIPS Agreement or what is currently available in many Asian
countries.
This outcome is the most likely and is already happening. The
terms of the RCEP intellectual property chapter will be even more
diluted if the negotiations have to conclude soon-that is, before China,
India, and other emerging countries further elevate their intellectual
property standards to match their rapidly changing local conditions.
After all, the current standards in these countries are still quite close
to those of the developing-country members of ASEAN+6.
This final outcome also reflects the approach currently taken by
both China and India in their FTA negotiations. If one is interested in
the type of intellectual property provisions that will find their way to
the final text of the RCEP Agreement, a good starting point will be the
China-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement 242 (CSFTA) or the
European Union-India Free Trade Agreement.243
Take the CSFTA, for instance. Although China was somewhat
reluctant to include an expansive intellectual property chapter in its
early FTAs-such as those with Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, and
Singapore 244 -the CSFTA contains a significantly more detailed
242. Free Trade Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the People's
Republic of China, Switz.-China, July 6, 2013, 2006, https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user
upload/JuristischeInfos/e/Switzerland ChinaFTAMainAgreement.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5ZA5-Q3A7] (archived Feb. 4, 2017) [hereinafter CSFTA].
243. See Patralekha Chatterjee, Leaked IP Chapter of India-EU FTA Shows
TRIPS-Plus Pitfalls for India, Expert Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 12, 2013, 5:35
PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/12/leaked-ip-chapter-of-india-eu-fta-shows-trips-
plus-pitfalls-for-india-expert-says/ [https://perma.cc/AA4X-8V22] (archived Feb. 4, 2017)
(reporting about the leaked draft text of the intellectual property chapter of the India-
European Union Free Trade Agreement).
244. As the Author noted in an earlier book chapter:
[T]he intellectual property chapters in [China's FTAs] continue to increase in
size, content, sophistication and complexity. While neither the [agreement] with
Singapore nor the one with Pakistan has a single intellectual property provision,
the intellectual property chapter in the [China-New Zealand Free Trade
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intellectual property chapter. 245 The inclusion of such a lengthy
chapter is perhaps due to Switzerland's insistence on high standards
of intellectual property protection and enforcement, especially after the
very limited success, if not failure, of the ACTA negotiations. The
existence of such a chapter is also attributable to the timing of the
CSFTA, which was signed in July 2013, as opposed to the mid- to late
2000s. By then, China had already had its National Intellectual
Property Strategy in place for five years. 246 The country had also
completely overhauled its patent law and was only a few weeks away
from adopting the new amendments to its trademark law.247
Indeed, the CSFTA bears a remarkable resemblance to the
current leaked draft of the RCEP intellectual property chapter.
Although the former includes provisions found in the TRIPS
Agreement and other TRIPS-plus FTAs, some of its provisions are
quite unique. Article 11.9 of the CSFTA, for example, offers language
on the disclosure of origin or source of genetic resources. Article 11.9
also calls for efforts "to enhance a mutually supportive relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, regarding genetic resources and traditional knowledge."248
In sum, like the CSFTA, the RCEP intellectual property chapter
is likely to contain lower standards than those found in the TPP
Agreement.249 It may also include language that is not found in that
Agreement] has close to 800 words. That number has quickly doubled to more
than 1500 words in the [China-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement] and again
doubled to more than 3000 words in the [China-Switzerland Free Trade
Agreement].
Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements and China's Global Intellectual Property Strategy,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIc REGION
247, 265 (Christoph Antons & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015).
245. See id. at 264-65 (discussing the intellectual property chapter in the China-
Switzerland Free Trade Agreement).
246. STATE COUNCIL, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY (2008), translated at http://english.gov.cn/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CKS8-8PB9] (archived Feb. 4, 2017); Peter
K. Yu, Five Oft-repeated Questions About China's Recent Rise as a Patent Power, 2013
CARDOZO L. REV. DE Novo 78, 90-96 (discussing China's National Intellectual Property
Strategy).
247. The third amendment to the Chinese Patent Law was adopted in December
2008, and the third amendment o the Chinese Trademark Law was adopted in August
2013, a month after the signature of the CSFTA. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note
197; Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended of Aug. 30, 2013, effective May. 1,
2014) (China), translated at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=341321 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NK7C-2RFX] (archived Feb. 4, 2017).
248. CSFTA, supra note 243, art. 11.9.
249. Cf. Du, supra note 33, at 425 ("[T]he FTAs negotiated by China and ASEAN
are typically less ambitious than the TPP, narrower in their coverage of trade in goods
and services, and having few WTO-plus provisions.").
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agreement and other TRIPS-plus FTAs. Only time will tell whether the
intellectual property standards in the RCEP Agreement will
complement or conflict with those found in the TPP Agreement. If
conflicts indeed arise, the resulting inconsistencies and tensions may
precipitate the "battle of the FTAs" discussed in Part 111.250 In this
battle, the TPP and the RCEP will further polarize ASEAN+6 members
while fragmenting the regional and international trading and
intellectual property systems.
VI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY DILEMMA
The previous Part asked the question of whether the final RCEP
Agreement will contain an intellectual property chapter. This Part
turns to a much more difficult question concerning the actual content
of this chapter-namely, how high the standards in the potential
RCEP intellectual property chapter will, and should, be. After
explaining why lower standards are naturally attractive to developing
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, this Part discusses why the recent
technological rise of China, India, and other emerging countries in the
region has revealed some benefits of higher intellectual property
standards. By bringing together these opposing views, this Part
highlights the challenging dilemmas confronting intellectual property
policymakers in the Asia-Pacific region.
A. Lower Standards
Since the developed countries' active push for bilateral and
regional FTAs in the mid-2000s, developing-country governments,
academic and policy commentators, and civil society organizations
have actively criticized these agreements for enclosing the policy space
of developing countries.251 These criticisms can be broken down into at
least five strands of arguments.
First, through the transplant of high intellectual property
standards.from the developed world252-often beyond what is required
250. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
251. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing FIAs in
the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting
Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade
Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259 (criticizing
the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in
the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004)
(discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher
intellectual property standards).
252. As the Trade Act of 2002 stated:
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by the TRIPS Agreement-bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
agreements are notorious for ignoring the local needs, national
interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and public
health conditions of developing countries.253 Because of the differences
in economic conditions, imitative or innovative capacity, and research
and development productivities, an innovative model that works well
in one country does not always suit the needs and interests of
another. 254 Unquestioned adoption of foreign intellectual property
laws therefore may not only fail to result in greater innovative efforts,
industrial progress, and technology transfer, but may also drain away
the resources needed for dealing with the socioeconomic and public
health problems created by the new legislation.
Second, the introduction of reforms based on foreign laws may
exacerbate the dire economic plight of many developing countries, as
the new laws would enable foreign rights holders in developed and
emerging countries to crush local industries through litigation threats
or actual lawsuits.255 Even if the new laws were beneficial in the long
run, many of these countries might not have the wealth, infrastructure,
and technological base to take advantage of the opportunities created
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related
intellectual property are . .. to further promote adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights, including through. . . ensuring that the provisions
of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property
rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection
- similar to that found in United States law ....
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2004).
253. See generally Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND.
L.J. 827 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, International Enclosure Movement] (discussing the
enclosure of the policy space developing countries have in designing intellectual property
systems that fit their needs, interests, conditions, and priorities).
254. See Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in
Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 93-97 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al.
eds., 1993) (arguing that countries should tailor intellectual property protection to their
economic needs, productive and research capabilities, and institutional and budgetary
constraints); David Silverstein, Intellectual Property Rights, Trading Patterns and
Practices, Wealth Distribution, Development and Standards of Living: A North-South
Perspective on Patent Law Harmonization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM 155, 156 (George R. Stewart et al. eds.,
1994) ("[A] truly successful [intellectual property] system must be culturally-specific and
responsive to the different economic and social realities of each country."); Yu,
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 254, at 889 ("[Bjecause of the differences
in economic conditions, imitative capacity, and research and development productivities,
an innovative model that works well in developed countries often does not suit the needs
and interests of less developed countries.") (footnote omitted).
255. See Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 30-31 (2002) (discussing
the lawsuit major pharmaceutical manufacturers brought against the South African
government).
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by the system in the short run.2 56 For countries with urgent public
policy needs and a population dying due to a lack of access to essential
medicines, the realization of the hope for a brighter long-term future
seems far away, if not unrealistic. If protection is strengthened beyond
the point of appropriate balance, the present population undoubtedly
would suffer greatly.
Third, although the development of uniform rules can be
beneficial, greater harmonization of legal standards can also take away
valuable opportunities for experimentation with new regulatory and
economic policies. 257 The creation of diversified rules could also
facilitate competition among jurisdictions, thereby rendering the
lawmaking process more accountable to the local populations by
allowing them to decide for themselves what rules and systems they
want to adopt.258 In the digital age, when laws are quickly introduced,
often without convincing empirical evidence, greater experimentation
and competition are indeed badly needed.259
Fourth, whether intentional or not, TRIPS-plus bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral agreements sometimes call for a higher level
of protection than what is currently offered in the developed world260 -
256. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
EcONOMY 237 (2000) (noting that "long-run gains would come at the expense of costlier
access in the medium term").
257. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 707-08 (2002) (discussing how countries can develop legal
systems by experimenting with new regulatory and economic policies).
258. See id. at 706-07 (discussing how variation in standards will breed
interjurisdictional competition, which in turn will provide a check on governmental
inefficiency and abuse).
259. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U.
L. REV. 13, 40-58 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention]
(using anti-circumvention protection to illustrate why developing countries may need
different laws in this area).
260. As Carlos Correa observed:
The [Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement] . . . raises
questions about how bilateral the U.S. bilateralism actually is. As mentioned,
the absolute and automatic patent-registration linkage seems to go beyond U.S.
law. Also, Article 15.10 may ban, in practice, the use of patented inventions for
compulsory licensing and governmental non-commercial purposes. By creating
through bilateral negotiations standards of protection higher than those applied
domestically, the powerful U.S. pharmaceutical industry may be able to force an
amendment of U.S. domestic law in ways simpler and less costly that through
lobbying in Congress.
Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for
Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 79, 93 (2004); see also Yu, Anticircumvention
and Anti-Anticircumvention, supra note 260, at 41 (lamenting that "the [anti-
circumvention] protection under the free trade agreements is often stronger than what
is required under the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act]").
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for instance, by omitting important limitations and exceptions.26 1 If
developed countries, such as the European Union or the United States,
do not even see the benefits of having such high standards, one has to
wonder why higher standards are needed in countries that have more
limited resources and that often lack adequate safeguards or correction
mechanisms.262
Fifth, the web of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional agreements
could lead to fragmentation. Commentators have referred to such
261. A case in point is the provision on technological protection measures. The
anti-circumvention provision of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act includes a
wide variety of limitations and exceptions. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)-(j) (2012) (providing
exceptions for nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions; law
enforcement, intelligence, and other government activities; law enforcement,
intelligence, and other government activities; encryption research; minors; and security
testing). By contrast, Article 18.68 of the TPP Agreement does not include those
exceptions. See TPP Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.68. Instead, Article 18.68.4 merely
allows a TPP partner to
provide certain limitations and exceptions to the [covered technological
protection] measures . . . in order to enable non-infringing uses if there is an
actual or likely adverse impact of those measures on those non-infringing uses,
as determined through a legislative, regulatory, or administrative process in
accordance with the Party's law, giving due consideration to evidence when
presented in that process, including with respect to whether appropriate and
effective measures have been taken by rights holders to enable the beneficiaries
to enjoy the limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights under that
Party's law.
Id. art. 18.68.4(a).
262. As the Author noted in an earlier article:
Although commentators have emphasized the importance of a counter-balancing
competition system, it remains disturbing that many less developed countries do
not have the resources to put together at the same time both a patent system
and a competition system; instead, they often have to choose between the two.
Many of these countries also may not have the ability to put in place a correction
mechanism once they have exhausted their financial and human resources to
update or strengthen their intellectual property system. Even worse, because
reforms based on foreign models always incur political costs on those pushing
the reforms, policymakers may have limited political capital to put in place
further "correction" reforms once their initial reforms fail.
Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 254, at 889 (footnotes omitted); see
also COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (2002) ("We consider that, if anything, the costs of getting the IP
system 'wrong' in a developing country are likely to be far higher than in developed
countries. Most developed countries have sophisticated systems of competition
regulation to ensure that abuses of any monopoly rights cannot unduly affect the public
interest."); MASKUS, supra note 257, at 237 (noting that developed countries "have
mature legal systems of corrective interventions" where "the exercise of [intellectual
property rights] threatens to be anticompetitive or excessively costly in social terms").
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fragmentation as the "spaghetti bowl"263 -or, in the Asian context, the
"noodle bowl"264-which is filled with "a mish-mash of overlapping,
supporting, and possibly conflicting, obligations." 265 Although
fragmentation has its benefits, commentators tend to agree that it
would hurt developing countries more than it would help them. Eyal
Benvenisti and George Downs, for example, described a number of
ways in which the growing proliferation of international regulatory
263. See Jagdish Bhagwati, US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade
Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2-3 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1995) (coining the term "spaghetti bowl"); see also
Beijing Roadmap, supra note 29 ("The proliferation of regional RTAs/FTAs has ...
resulted in a 'spaghetti bowl' effect, posing complex new challenges to regional economic
integration and to business."). One commentator described this bowl vividly as "a certain
lumpiness, with the spaghetti tangled in or around four or five discernible clumps-
meatballs, perhaps." Viet D. Do & William Watson, Economic Analysis and Regional
Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND WTO, supra note 36, at 7, 10.
264. See Wang, supra note 201, at 224 (noting 'Asian noodle bowl effect' as
highlighted by officials of the Asian Development Bank"); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements,
supra note 72, at 978 (noting the creation of the "noodle bowl" in Asia); Richard E.
Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism (Asian
Dev. Bank, Working Paper on Regional Economic Integration No. 7, 2007),
http://www.adb.org/documents/papers/regional-economic-integration/WP07-Baldwin.pdf
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CU6B-XQ73] (archived Feb. 4, 2017);
Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges 3 (Asian
Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 144, 2009), http://www.adb.org/documents/Working-
Papers/2010/ Economics-WP226.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M6XN-
B7WX] (archived Feb. 4, 2017) (noting "a 'noodle bowl' problem of crisscrossing
agreements that potentially distort trade toward bilateral channels, excessive exclusions
and special treatment in FTAs, and the possibility that the multilateral trading system
may be progressively eroded"). Jagdish Bhagwati traced the term "noodle bowl" to
President Haruhiko Kuroda of the Asian Development Bank. JAGDISH N BHAGWATI,
TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: How PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE
TRADE 63 n.16 (2008).
265. Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, supra note 80, at 1, 2; accord JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI,
A STREAM OF WINDOWS: UNSETTLING REFLECTIONS ON TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND
DEMOCRACY 290 (1999) ("As [preferential trade agreements] proliferate, the main
problem that arises is the proliferation in turn of discriminatory access to markets, with
a whole maze of trade duties and barriers that vary according to source."); Rafael Leal-
Arcas, The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards Partnership in Strategic
Trade Policy Areas, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 345, 375 (2009) ("Further proliferation of
FTAs results in transaction costs that serve to the detriment of multilateral trade
liberalization at the WTO level, thereby provoking a fragmentation of multilateralism.");
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Prisoners' Dilemma and FTAs: Applying Game Theory to
Trade Liberalization Strategy, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE, supra note 82,
at 21, 25 ("The large number of FTAs has led to a trading system with complicated and
sometimes inconsistent rules due to different rules of origin."); Jeffrey J. Schott, Free
Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System, in FTA STRATEGIES AND
PRIORITIES, supra note 85, at 3, 14-15 (expressing concern about "domino regionalism"
that "fragments the trading system into protectionist blocs or spurs competitive
liberalization that reinforces multilateral reforms" and noting that FTAs "can create
overlapping sets of trade rules and regulations that make sourcing products to different
markets complicated and often more costly").
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institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries
has helped powerful states to preserve their dominance.26 6
In addition, the existence of a dense web of bilateral and regional
trade agreements could create conflicting obligations within many
developing countries. 267 It is bad enough to be forced to sign an
agreement that does not accommodate local conditions, but it is even
worse to be put in a position of juggling two potentially conflicting
agreements that do not accommodate local conditions and that are very
difficult, if not impossible, to honor.
In sum, many reasons exist to support the RCEP's adoption of
low standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement.
Such adoption would be consistent with the development agendas
that have been established at the WTO and WIPO and in other
266. As Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs wrote:
First, [fragmentation] limits the ability of weaker states to engage in the
logrolling that is necessary for them to bargain more effectively with more
powerful states . . . . Second, by creating a multitude of competing institutions
with overlapping responsibilities, fragmentation provides powerful states with
the opportunity to abandon-or threaten to abandon-any given venue for a
more sympathetic venue if their demands are not met . . .. Third, a fragmented
system's piecemeal character suggests an absence of design and obscures the role
of intentionality . . .. This has helped obscure the fact that fragmentation is in
part the result of a calculated strategy by powerful states to create a legal order
that both closely reflects their interests and that only they have the capacity to
alter.
Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 597-98 (2007).
267. As Robert Scollay noted:
A particular problem for convergence arises if more than one major economy
establishes its own FTA "template", and if there are inconsistencies between the
different "templates". The outlook then is for the establishment of multiple "hub
and spoke" configurations centred on each major economy as a "hub", where the
FTAs in each configuration converge on the "template" of the "hub", but where
the prospect of convergence between the configurations with their inconsistent
"templates" is remote. Other economies may then either seek to follow one of the
"hub" templates in their own FTAs, as Mexico has tended to do (essentially
following the NAFTA template), or, if they seek to participate in more than one
"hub and spoke" configuration, be willing to adapt the design of their FTAs to
the "template" of each configuration, as Chile and Singapore have tended to do.
Robert Scollay, Prospects for Linking Preferential Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific
Region, in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA?, supra note 22, at 164, 185; see also Yu, Access to
Medicines, supra note 12, at 386 (suggesting that "conflicts may arise if less developed
countries sign the trade agreements supplied by both the European Communities and
the United States without appropriate review and modification"); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS
and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 407 (2006) (highlighting the
need to better understand the tension between the European Union and the United
States so as to avoid making commitments to conflicting FTA obligations).
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international fora.268 Such adoption will also be important if the final
agreement provides limited special and differential treatment to the
poorer RCEP partners,269 especially those in the least developed
world.
B. Higher Standards
Although policymakers and commentators tend to have a kneejerk
resistance to high international intellectual property standards, the
need for low standards-or what Daniel Gervais has called "the
subtractive narrative" 270 -does not present the complete picture.
Indeed, the recent technological rise of China, India, and other
emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific region has called for a pause to
rethink appropriate intellectual property norm-setting strategies.
During the TRIPS negotiations, developing countries were
repeatedly told that the TRIPS Agreement, along with other
commitments in the WTO, would provide the painful medicine they
need to boost economic development. As Professor Gervais observed in
the TRIPS context, these countries "were told to overlook the
distasteful aspects of introducing or increasing intellectual property
protection and enforcement in exchange for longer-term economic
health."271 Although it is easy to dismiss the sales pitch of TRIPS
advocates and supporters, it is much harder to evaluate whether
China, India, and the now-emerging countries in the Asia-Pacific
region have in fact benefited from the many economic reforms pushed
on them by the WTO Agreement.
Indeed, many policymakers and commentators have taken the
view that China would not have been as economically developed and
as technologically proficient as it is today had it not embraced the
reforms required by WTO accession.272 To be certain, one could still
268. See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
465, 511-40 (2009) (discussing these development agendas).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 197-204 (underscoring the need for
special and differential treatments in the RCEP).
270. Daniel Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full
TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2353, 2357-60 (2009) (discussing the
attacks on the TRIPS Agreement and the subtractive narrative).
271. Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and
Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); see
also Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 166, 166-67 (1994) (arguing that developing countries agreed to stronger
intellectual property protection during the TRIPS negotiations because they found such
protection in their self-interests).
272. As the Author noted in an earlier article:
To some extent, the push for China to strengthen intellectual property protection
has resulted in the slow and paradoxical erosion of the United States' competitive
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debate whether the improvements actually originated from the WTO
or from the TRIPS Agreement-an important distinction.
Nevertheless, the WTO's "single undertaking" approach has virtually
guaranteed this distinction to be a non-issue. Under this approach, any
country acceding to the WTO cannot have non-intellectual property
reforms and benefits without also implementing the TRIPS-based
reforms.273
Moreover, as China moved from the stage of transplanting foreign
laws to the stage of developing indigenous standards,274 the country
skillfully deployed "selective adaptation" strategieS275 to ensure the
position. This point sounds counterintuitive, but it actually makes a lot of sense.
From a long-term competition standpoint, greater intellectual property
protection will make China more innovative and therefore more competitive.
Such increased competitiveness will slowly erode the competitive advantage the
United States has traditionally enjoyed as a result of its much higher intellectual
property standards.
Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 525, 550-51 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 3, at 195
("The last time China signed on to a difficult trade agreement was when it joined the
WTO, and after a period of costly but necessary domestic reforms, it benefited
dramatically."); Chang, supra note 63 ("[China] reaped large gains after it joined the
World Trade Organization in December 2001, due mostly to the reforms required by its
accession agreement.").
273. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art.
2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 ("The agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 [including the TRIPS Agreement] . . . are integral parts
of this Agreement, binding on all Members."); see also Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/English/docs-ellegal-e/ursume.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/JR3E-MH67] (archived Feb. 4, 2017) ("The WTO
framework ensures a 'single undertaking approach' to the results of the Uruguay
Round-thus, membership in the WTO entails accepting all the results of the Round
without exception.").
274. See Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the
Chinese Patent System, 5 WIPO J. 1, 3-13 (2013) (discussing the different stages of
intellectual property reform in China, including creation, imitation and transplantation,
standardization and customization, and indigenization); see also Guo He, Patents, in
CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS 25, 28 (Rohan Kariyawasam
ed., 2011) ("The impetus for the early amendments [to Chinese Patent Law] came from
outside, whilst the need for the third amendment originated from within China, that is
to say, the majority of the third amendment was to meet the needs of the development
of the domestic economy and technology originating in China.").
275. As Pitman Potter describes, China takes the norms by engaging in "selective
adaptation" based on local conditions:
Applied to China, selective adaptation analysis permits understanding of local
responses to international legal obligations. China's interpretation and
implementation of international agreements in trade, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and agreements associated with the. . .
WTO ... , for example, will depend on the extent to which interpretive
communities-comprising government officials, socio-economic and professional
elites, and other privileged groups exercising authority borne of political and/or
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incorporation of only beneficial features from the outside without also
transplanting the harmful and unsuitable elements. 276 In the past
fifteen years, China has had its fair share of WTO disputes, 277
including China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights.278 China prevailed in some of these
disputes but lost in others.279
professional position, specialized knowledge, and/or socio-economic status-
assimilate norms of trade liberalization.
Influenced by their training and education, members of China's interpretive
communities bring their perceptions about international law and relations to
bear in responding to the requirements of international rule regimes.
Perceptions contrasting China's colonial past and resulting weakness in foreign
relations with its current strengths tend to encourage both a sense of grievance
and of opportunities for correction and redress. Perception dynamics are also
evident in academic and policy assessments of the international legal system
that acknowledge the challenges posed by globalization for sovereignty
imperatives of the nation-state generally, and focus on the intrusive nature of
international regimes whose underlying norms are seen as a challenge to China.
Such perceptions affect the reception of international legal standards by local
interpretive communities, and ultimately China's responses of implementation.
Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Participation,
in CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEw DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES 145, 147-48 (Donald
C. Clarke ed., 2008) (footnotes omitted); accord Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of
Progress: The Development of the Intellectual Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117,
118-19 (2009) (discussing the stage of "selective arrangement in light of domestic
development"); see also Frederick S. Tipson, China and the Information Revolution, in
CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 231, 232 (Elizabeth Economy &
Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999) ("Th[e] attempt to borrow selectively from outsiders is a
familiar one in Chinese history.").
276. See Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 236 (discussing how
China not only transplanted intellectual property laws from abroad but also transformed
them to suit the local contexts); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of
Objective Assessment in the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation
of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 77, 100 (2005) (noting the possibility for "benign
neglect" of the TRIPS Agreement).
277. See Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 2, at 1140 ("China
has ... been the respondent in a growing number of WTO complaints, on issues ranging
from intellectual property enforcement to duties on steel products to exports of rare
earths."). See generally CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE, supra note 55
(collecting essays discussing China's performance in its first decade in the WTO).
278. Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009).
279. In China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, for example, China prevailed on the first claim concerning the
thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties, but the United States won the last
claim concerning the denial of copyright protection to works that have not been
authorized for publication or dissemination within China. Somewhat divided between
the two parties was the remaining claim concerning the failure of the Chinese customs
authorities to properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the border. See id. For the
Author's discussions of this dispute, see generally Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and
Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727 (2011); Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, supra note 237.
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In sum, even though one could continue to debate how much China,
India, and other emerging countries have benefited from TRIPS-induced
intellectual property reforms, it is much harder to deny the contributions
the TRIPS Agreement has provided to the economic development and
technological proficiency in these countries. Thus, as much as
policymakers and commentators are eager to criticize the deleterious
effects of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements,
they cannot lose sight of the agreements' potential positive benefits.
In the RCEP context, debating what flexibilities, safeguards, and
correction mechanisms are needed in the final agreement will likely be
more productive than exploring ways to resist the incorporation of
TRIPS-plus standards. It will also be interesting to see whether
countries in the Asia-Pacific region will end up accepting norms that
are now enshrined in TRIPS-plus FTAs. Indeed, as the Author noted
in the inaugural issue of the WIPO Journal several years ago, "[i]t is
premature to assume that less-developed countries, once developed,
will always want the existing international intellectual property
system. There is a good chance that they may want or need something
rather different."280
VII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the standards included in the final intellectual
property chapter, the RCEP will raise important questions about the
future of intellectual property norm setting in the Asia-Pacific region
and about the future levels of protection and enforcement that will be
found in intellectual property systems across this region. That the
RCEP negotiations have involved many different trade and trade-
related areas will also drive ASEAN+6 members to think more deeply
about the future directions of both their national economy and the
overall regional economy.
Given that intellectual property will remain a crucial part of the
twenty-first-century economy, and that its importance can only grow
with time, ASEAN+6 members will squander a major opportunity to
harmonize regional intellectual property standards if the RCEP
Agreement does not include an intellectual property chapter. If the
standards in this chapter are set too high, however, they will also
impede future development, erode global competitiveness, and
jeopardize access to essential medicines, educational materials, and
information technology. Given these immense challenges and the high
stakes involved, it is high time that policymakers, commentators,
activists, consumer advocates, and civil society organizations studied
the RCEP negotiations more closely.
280. Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined
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